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Speaking with Complete Candor:
Shareholder Ratification and the
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty
by
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
Introduction
Few corporate law doctrines matter more than the duty of
loyalty. Designed to protect the shareholders from the consequences
of improper self-dealing, the duty applies to transactions with the
corporation that benefit officers, directors, or other fiduciaries. The
duty of loyalty imposes a high standard of utmost fairness. Moreover,
recognizing that directors may act out of self-interest rather than out
of the best interest of shareholders, the duty of loyalty places the
burden of establishing fairness on the fiduciary with the conflict of
interest.'
Recent controversies have reaffirmed the need for strict
regulation of the duty of loyalty. Whether the severance package
given to John F. (Jack) Welch, the former CEO of General Electric,2
or the $400 million loan to Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO of
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Denver
College of Law. Thanks to Allison Herren, Celia R. Taylor, Elaine Welle, and Lawrence
A. Hamermesh for comments on earlier drafts.
1. See infra notes 25-26.
2. Companies must make detailed disclosure of executive compensation. See Item
402, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2002). Disclosure of severance packages is less
robust. Welch received a lucrative package that, in addition to annual payments of $9
million, included around-the-clock access to the company jet, a Mercedes Benz, courtside
tickets, and apartments, complete with fresh flowers and a cook. The information only
came to light as a result of the filing of a financial affidavit in divorce proceedings. See
Michael Barbaro, A King's Ransom in Retirement Benefits; GE Pays Ex-CEO Millions a
Year in Pension, Perks, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2002, at El. In response to the criticism,




WorldCom,3 corporate executives sitting on the board have obtained
huge personal benefits from the companies they oversee. Despite the
central importance of fairness to the duty of loyalty, however, the
trend has been to eliminate any analysis of fairness, replacing
substantive review with procedural safeguards.
This has been particularly true with respect to ratification by
disinterested shareholders. If done properly, disinterested ratification
results in the application of the business judgment rule. In those
circumstances, courts will not examine the fairness of the transactions.
Aggrieved shareholders are left only with a cause of action for waste,
an all but insurmountable standard.
The wisdom of a policy allowing a majority of disinterested
shareholders in a public company to consent to, and thereby
immunize from challenge, self-dealing is questionable.! Shareholder
approval involves the usual problems associated with collective
action, including shareholder apathy. More important, disinterested
approval does not expunge the taint arising from a conflict of interest.
Interested shareholders and directors may still participate in, and
influence, the decision-making process.' Therefore, interested
influence remains, notwithstanding disinterested approval.
There is also reason to doubt that disinterested approval is
actually disinterested. Delaware courts have not defined
"disinterested" shareholder. Management, therefore, has
considerable discretion in determining which votes to count.
Management also has no express obligation to implement a system
designed to insure that interested shares are not counted in the final
total. With shareholder identity easily obscured through nominee
accounts and other forms of beneficial ownership, this possibility
amounts to more than a theoretical concern.
3. See Proxy Statement, WorldCom, Inc. (April 22, 2002) (describing terms of offer),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000091205702015985/
0000912057-02-015985.txt.
4. See infra notes 19, 44.
5. See infra notes 41, 42. For a discussion of these concerns, see generally Victor
Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty
Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209 (2000).
6. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345,363 (Del. 1993):
Nothing we said [in Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984),] suggests that one
director's self-interest, or even an act of disloyalty by that director, so infects the
entire process that the board itself is deprived of the benefit of the business
judgment rule. This Court has never held that one director's colorable interest in
a challenged transaction is sufficient, without more, to deprive a board of the
protection of the business judgment rule presumption of loyalty.
(italics omitted). See also infra note 67.
7. For public companies, section 16 under the Exchange Act provides a mechanism
for identifying beneficial ownership of directors, executive officers, and 10% shareholders.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2002). The provision extends to shares beneficially owned by
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Finally, the courts universally give effect to disinterested
ratification only if shareholders are properly informed. Informed
shareholders must have all material information when consenting to
the self-dealing. In practice, however, they often do not. Delaware
courts repeatedly consider immaterial categories of information
among the most important to shareholders in deciding how to vote.
As a result, disinterested shareholders in reality are not informed at
the time of ratification.
The uninformed nature of the decision making process is the
clearest in two contexts: sale of the business and conflicts of interest.
With respect to sale of the business, Delaware courts decline to find
as material categories of information suggesting the inadequacy of the
offering price. They do not require the disclosure of additional,
higher-priced offers, alternative formulas used to compare value,
even if presented to the board, or other valuations in the company's
possession. The courts have even gone so far as to characterize this
type of information as harmful.'
Similarly, with respect to conflicts of interest and improper
managerial behavior, Delaware courts use the "self-flagellation"
doctrine to exempt the information from disclosure. The doctrine
traditionally exempted companies from any obligation to characterize
improper behavior or otherwise admit to legal violations. They did,
however, have to disclose the surrounding facts, allowing
shareholders to draw their own conclusions. Delaware courts have
expanded the self-flagellation doctrine to encompass surrounding
facts. As a result, they characterize as immaterial information
suggesting that management will benefit from the transaction, has
engaged in improper behavior, or has motivations not necessarily
consonant with the best interests of shareholders.
The interpretation of materiality by Delaware courts lies in sharp
contrast to that used in the federal system. Although both rely on an
these actors. Id. Public companies would, therefore, have some idea of the number of
shares held by insiders and large shareholders. The provision does not necessarily cover
all shares that would be held by interested parties. More to the point, section 16 identifies
the number of shares held by these individuals but does not identify the accounts. Id.
Companies may know the total ownership of the insiders but, to the extent shares are held
in street name accounts, will not necessarily know the number actually voted. Bielski v.
Cabletron Sys. (In re Cabletron Sys.), 311 F.3d 11, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Merely stating in
conclusory fashion that a company's books are out of compliance with [Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP")] would not in itself demonstrate liability
under section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.") For a discussion of the use of nominee accounts and
their implications for corporate governance, see J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 15.04 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003).
8. See infra notes 82, 190 and accompanying text. Some have suggested that
disclosure would amount to misrepresentation. See infra notes 227, 254-56 and
accompanying text.
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identical definition of materiality,' a comparison of cases suggests
that, while state courts use the same terminology, they rely on a far
more restrictive interpretation. As a result, shareholders do not
always receive information that federal courts would deem
"important" to a "reasonable investor."'
0
The comparison between state and federal case law exposes a
central weakness in the use of disinterested shareholder approval to
ratify conflicts of interest. To the extent that substantive review gives
way to procedural safeguards, the procedural safeguards must be
meaningful. Meaningful safeguards require full disclosure. Yet at
least in the area of disinterested shareholder approval, this has not
occurred."
This Article has four parts. The first examines fiduciary
obligations and the impact of disinterested shareholder ratification.
The second analyzes the development of the duty of complete
honesty and the fiduciary obligation to keep shareholders informed.
The third section compares state and federal disclosure cases,
highlighting the difference in the application of the materiality
standard. The last section discusses the implications of using
disinterested shareholder approval to eliminate an examination of the
fairness of the transaction.
I. Shareholder Ratification and the Duty of Loyalty
A. Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary obligations have a talismanic quality in the corporate
context. They represent the only significant limitation on board
action. Although corporate law originally contained a large number
of absolute restraints on managerial behavior, most were repealed,
either by statute or judicial interpretation. 2 As a result, the board
9. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 992 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(noting that Delaware has adopted "the federal standard" for materiality). The antifraud
provisions generally include section 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2002), and Rules
10b-5, 14a-9, and 14e-3 of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14a-9, 240.14e-3
(2002).
10. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
I. See infra notes 136-52; 173-225 and accompanying text.
12. Corporations were originally subject to strict limitations, particularly on size.
Those restrictions are discussed at length in a dissent by Justice Brandeis in Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-64 (1933). Gradually, these restraints were repealed,
and the issue became a matter of board discretion. Blank-check preferred stock
provisions allowed management to issue new classes of shares without shareholder
approval. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.02
(1984). Elimination of purpose clauses enabled managers to dramatically change the
nature of the business without shareholder consent. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
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gained more discretion, with fiduciary obligations the only significant
guarantor of the integrity of the actions.
Fiduciary obligations include the duty of care, which commands
that directors act in the best interests of shareholders, and the duty of
loyalty, which requires directors engaging in self-dealing to act with
utmost good faith and scrupulous fairness.'3 Under the duty of care,
directors must discharge their duties "in good faith, in a
manner.., reasonably believe[d] to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person
would reasonably be exp ected to exercise in a like position and under
similar circumstances."' In the case of board action," courts will not
§ 2.02. More recently, Delaware courts have eliminated long-standing prohibitions on
discriminatory treatment of shareholders within the same class, see Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985), and the requirement that fiduciaries not usurp a
corporate opportunity without first presenting the matter to the board of directors. See
Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996).
13. The Delaware Supreme Court characterizes the board's fiduciary obligations as a
triad that includes care, loyalty, and good faith. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10
(Del. 1998); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). The Supreme
Court has provided little content to an independent duty of good faith. Moreover, the
lower courts have largely ignored it, treating it as a subcategory of loyalty. See Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002):
Because the duty to act in "good faith" is merely a subset of a director's duty of
loyalty, my consideration of Orman's duty of loyalty allegations necessarily
includes a consideration of whether the facts pled suggest the defendants did not
act in good faith with regard to their duty of loyalty to the Company.
See also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *87 n.63 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 7,2001):
Although corporate directors are unquestionably obligated to act in good faith,
doctrinally that obligation does not exist separate and apart from the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. Rather, it is a subset or "subsidiary requirement" that is
subsumed within the duty of loyalty, as distinguished from being a
compartmentally distinct fiduciary duty of equal dignity with the two bedrock
fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care.
See also In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch.
2000) ("Within which traditional duty [of loyalty] would logically rest the subsidiary
requirement to act in good, rather than bad, faith toward the company and its
stockholders.").
14. 1 PRIN. CORP. Gov. § 4.01(a) (1993). This Article does not address the
heightened standards of board behavior that occurs during a change of control. See
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); Unocal, 493
A.2d at 954.
15. The business judgment rule does not apply to board inaction, except where
deliberate. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
However, it should be noted that the business judgment rule operates only in the
context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where directors
have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act.
But it also follows that under applicable principles, a conscious decision to
refrain from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and
enjoy the protections of the rule.
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consider whether behavior has violated the duty of care unless
plaintiffs rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule.'"
The business judgment rule insulates board decisions made in
good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interests of
shareholders.'7 Courts largely limit the analysis to the process used in
making the decision.9 To the extent boards follow the proper pro-
cedures, plaintiffs are reduced to claims for waste, an extraordinarily
difficult standard to meet and one "very rarely satisfied."'9 The result
of this approach is a "rubber-stamp" of director behavior."'
Id. (footnote omitted). For the standards applicable to inaction, sometimes labeled the
duty to monitor, see In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch.
1996).
16. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) (The business judgment rule
creates "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company." (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812)).
17. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Successfully rebutting the presumption that the
business judgment rule does not result in per se liability. Instead, the burden shifts to the
directors to show the "entire fairness" of the transaction. See McMullin, 765 A.2d at 917;
Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
18. Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board Action to Meet the Ever-
Decreasing Scope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 508 (1999) ("Thus, at bottom,
the business judgment rule reflects little more than process inquiry.").
19. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 18,
1995); see also In re Limited Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28,
at *37 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) ("The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the
Company received no benefit in exchange for these two transactions or that these
transactions, taken together, served no corporate purpose."); Harbor Fin. Partners v.
Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("The pleading burden on a plaintiff
attacking a corporate transaction as wasteful is necessarily higher than that of a plaintiff
challenging a transaction as 'unfair' as a result of the directors' conflicted loyalties or lack
of due care."). Waste "entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might
be willing to trade." Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). The
imposition of a waste standard in the case of shareholder ratification preceded the
adoption of section 144. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952)
(In the case of shareholder ratification, "the objecting stockholder must convince the court
that no person of ordinarily sound business judgment would be expected to entertain the
view that the consideration furnished by the individual directors is a fair exchange for the
options conferred."). Some courts have questioned the need for an action for waste that
survives the application of the business judgment rule. See Harbor Financial Partners, 751
A.2d at 895-902. Nonetheless, unless changed significantly in Delaware, the courts have
long recognized that a board can be insulated from waste only by obtaining unanimous
approval of shareholders. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (Del. Ch. 1962); see also
Lewis, 699 A.2d at 335. In any event, it may make no difference. See Rosser v. New
Valley Corp., No. 17272, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *23 (Del. Ch. August 15, 2000) ("So
while fully informed shareholder ratification may not be tantamount to the death penalty
for breach of fiduciary duty claims, application of the business judgment rule will lead to
the same end result in virtually every case.").
20. Engledow, supra note 18 at 507. See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-300 (1999).
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The business judgment rule essentially represents an over-
inclusive protection designed to insulate directors who take risks.'
There seems to be consensus that the benefits of protecting risk-
taking outweigh the harm of allowing directors to occasionally escape
liability for mismanagement.22 This rationale, however, only works in
cases devoid of conflicts of interest. In the absence of competing
motivations, courts presume that the board tried to do what was best
for shareholders, no matter how disastrous the decision turned out to
be in hindsight."
B. Duty of Loyalty and Disinterested Approval
In contrast, transactions involving conflicts of interest give rise to
heightened concern because of the possibility that the board was
motivated by something other than the best interests of
shareholders.24 With the presence of competing motivations, the
transaction has no presumption of validity. The board, therefore, has
a higher burden25 and must demonstrate that the transaction meets
the standard of "entire fairness."26 Entire fairness, in turn, requires a
showing of both fair price27 and fair procedure."
21. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The business
judgment rule.., operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the
business and affairs of a corporation.").
22. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1980); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1704 (2002).
23. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782; Kaplan v.
Centrex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971).
24. The duty applies whenever board members have an interest in the transaction at
issue. Interest occurs where directors "appear on both sides of a transaction [or] expect to
derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a
benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally." Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812.
25. The standard has been described as "uncompromising." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939).
26. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983):
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction,
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain. The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he
has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts.
(citation omitted). See also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 265 (Del. 2002)
("Like any other interested transaction, directoral self-compensation decisions lie outside
the business judgment rule's presumptive protection, so that, where properly challenged,
the receipt of self-determined benefits is subject to an affirmative showing that the
compensation arrangements are fair to the corporation."); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787
A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001) ("When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors,
generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business
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The case law addressing the impact of disinterested shareholder
approval has been confused and has changed over time. The
evolution largely turned on an inaccurate reading of section 144 of
the Delaware Corporate Code. Adopted in 1967, section 144
provides that certain interested transactions shall not be "void or
voidable"29 solely because of participation by interested directors"' if:
(1) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors,
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the
contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote
of the shareholders; or (3) The contract or transaction is fair as to
the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified,
by the board of directors, a committee or the shareholders.3
The provision has a number of limiting features. First, it applies
only to a narrow category of self-dealing transactions. Specifically,
the section governs transactions between the corporation and its
officers/directors or the corporation and any entity controlled by the
directors.32 Other self-interested transactions fall outside the statute.33
judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire
fairness analysis."). The duty of loyalty applies to both common and preferred
shareholders. See Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 386 (Del. Ch.
1999).
27. Fair price requires a showing "that the price offered was the highest value
reasonably available under the circumstances." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345,
361 (Del. 1993).
28. Entire fairness applies where "self-interest may have colored the directors'
actions." Thorpe v. CERBCO, 676 A.2d 436, 443 n.9 (Del. 1996). The interest must,
however, be "substantial." Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2002).
The essential distinction between voidable and void acts is that the former are
those which may be found to have been formed in the interest of the corporation
but beyond the authority of management, as distinguished from acts which are
ultra vires, fraudulent or gifts or waste of corporate assets.
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 21 I, 218-19 (Del. 1979).
30. Specifically, the provision applies to any "contract or transaction between a
corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any
other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its
directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2002).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
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In particular, the section does not apply to transactions with
controlling shareholders, 3" a situation particularly applicable in the
context of parents and subsidiaries.35 Nor does it apply where a
director benefits from, but is not a party to, the transaction:
Second, the provision provides protection for transactions
approved by a "good faith.., vote of the shareholders."37 It does not
require disinterested approval. 3" Although an argument could be
made that "good faith" implicitly requires disinterest, the argument
ignores the specific reference in the statute to the need for approval
by disinterested directors.39 A literal reading of the statute, therefore,
permits directors who own a majority of shares to approve their own
transaction with the company."'
33. It does not apply, for example, to a transaction with a third party where the
director benefits. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1174 (director received a finder's fee as a
result of merger).
34. Wholly owned subsidiaries would not create significant problems. On the other
hand, majority-owned subsidiaries with outside shareholders would raise concerns and
require a more exacting analysis of transactions between parent and subsidiary.
35. See id. at 1169 n.24.
36. See id. at 1174 ("hope of better employment opportunities" as a result of
transaction not covered by section 144). Courts have also applied principles under section
144 to entities other than for-profit corporations. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 469
(Del. 1991) (applying principles to transaction with a nonstock charitable corporation).
The provision is not exclusive, even for transactions that fall squarely within the statute.
Approval may be impossible where, for example, a quorum cannot be obtained or
shareholders and directors are evenly divided. Failure to obtain the requisite approval
does not result in a per se rule of voidability. Instead, courts will still apply a fairness
analysis before deciding whether to void the transaction. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535
A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) (statute inapplicable because of deadlock by shareholders and
interested nature of board; rather than void transaction, court relied on common law and
examined transaction for intrinsic fairness).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2002).
38. Delaware courts repeatedly and imprecisely characterize the language in section
144(a)(2) as requiring approval of a majority of "disinterested" shareholders. See, e.g., In
re Wheelabrator Tech. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 11t94, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995); Marciano,
535 A.2d at 405 n.3.
39. An argument could be made that the phrase was intended to mean a majority of all
disinterested shareholders. Nonetheless, internal consistency within the section suggests
otherwise. To the extent it intended this meaning, the statute did so explicitly. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2002) (specifying that approval was to be by a "majority of
the disinterested directors").
40. Indeed, some courts interpreting comparable statutes have suggested that
shareholder approval, even if by controlling shareholders, reduces a claim to waste. See
Camden v. Kaufman, 613 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Mich. App. 2000). Perhaps the requirement of
"good faith" in section 144 could be interpreted to mean disinterested. No case has ever
grounded the requirement in such an analysis and for a number of reasons it seems an
unlikely interpretation. Foremost, good faith seems to modify "vote" rather than
"shareholder." Moreover, to the extent the statute means disinterested, it uses the word
specifically when describing the requirements of board approval.
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Delaware courts have adopted a confused and result-oriented
interpretation of the shareholder ratification requirement in section
144. The section says nothing about the impact of shareholder
approval on the fairness analysis and it certainly does not state or
otherwise imply that it was intended to make actions by management
essentially unreviewable by the courts. Indeed, the earlier cases
interpreted section 144 as nothing more than a provision that
eliminated claims of voidability based solely on the presence of
41
interested directors in the decision-making process.
More recent decisions, however, have gone much further and
relied upon section 144 to substantively alter the standard of review
for transactions approved by disinterested shareholders.4 They have
concluded that informed approval by disinterested shareholders4
eliminates any analysis of fairness.44 Instead, the transaction becomes
41. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (approval under section
144 "merely removes an 'interested director' cloud when its terms are met and provides
against invalidation of an agreement 'solely' because such a director or officer is
involved."); see also Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 900 n.80 (Del. Ch.
1999) ("A non-comprehensive review of the treatises suggests that the law earlier in the
century was far less clear about whether 'interested' persons could vote as stockholders to
ratify or approve transactions."); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219-20 (Del. 1979)
("If shareholders have approved an otherwise voidable act, their approval extinguishes
any claim for losses based on prior lack of authority of the directors to undertake such
action."). As one commentator noted: "The Delaware statute ... essentially eliminates
the automatic common law taint of self-interested transactions." Michael P. Dooley &
Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act
and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 737, 743 (2001). One lower
court, however, has suggested that Fliegler is no longer good law. See Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 335 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that "[e]arly on it was narrowly held that
compliance with that section simply removed the automatic taint of a director conflict
transaction, but nevertheless left the transaction subject to substantive judicial review for
fairness").
42. In justifying the interpretation, the courts often relied on the language in, and
purpose of, section 144. As the Court of Chancery noted in In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation:
[O]ur courts have treated fully informed shareholder ratification under
§ 144(a)(2) as validating the transaction and removing it from the purview of
entire fairness review. The business judgment rule applies to the ratified
transaction, and to rebut its presumption, the plaintiff must allege facts showing
that no person of ordinary sound business judgment could view the benefits
received as a fair exchange for the consideration paid by the corporation, i.e., the
transaction amounts to corporate waste.
731 A.2d 342, 368 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
(footnotes omitted).
43. The same standard applies to approval by a board, the majority of which is
disinterested and independent. Doing so will "bring [the transaction] within the scope of
the business judgment rule." Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991); accord,
Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995).
44. At one time it seemed that Delaware courts might go even further and eliminate
all claims, including waste. The court in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del.
[Vol. 54HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
DUTY OF LOYALTY
subject to the business judgment rule, with plaintiff's cause of action
limited to claims of waste. Courts have done so with little analysis, 6
1985), noted in dictum that "[tihe settled rule in Delaware is that 'where a majority of fully
informed stockholders ratify action of even interested directors, an attack on the ratified
transaction normally must fail."' (quoting Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593) (Del. Ch.
1958). The case did not, however, involve a conflict of interest, at least not one recognized
by the court. Id. Recent cases have declined to read Smith so broadly and have generally
held that shareholder ratification does not eliminate a claim for waste. See Rosser v. New
Valley Corp., No. 17272, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *23 (Del. Ch. August 15, 2000); In
re Lukens Inc. S'holder Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 737 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that Smith stands
for the proposition that, "in the appropriate case, a fully informed vote of stockholders
approving a merger will extinguish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty stemming from a
board of directors' failure to reach an informed business judgment in authorizing that
transaction."). The interpretation is also consistent with traditional analysis of claims for
waste. Courts in Delaware have long recognized that claims for waste can only be
eliminated upon unanimous approval of shareholders. See Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d
at 882 ("But, under an unbroken line of authority dating from early in this century, a non-
unanimous, although overwhelming, free and fair vote of disinterested stockholders does
not extinguish a claim for waste."). This approach can be compared with the Revised
Model Business Corporations Act ("RMBCA"), which eliminates all claims following
approval by a disinterested majority of shareholders. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §
8.61 (1984). At least one commentator has called for an absolute rule:
Accordingly, a shareholder should be precluded from bringing an action against
an interested transaction that has been ratified by a fully-informed, disinterested
majority. Delaware courts should adopt a bright-line rule providing that fully-
informed shareholder ratification extinguishes claims based on the presence of
self-interest in a transaction between a director or controlling shareholder and
the corporation.
See Mary A. Jacobson, Note, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects
of Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1021 (1996).
45. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("On the other hand,
approval by fully-informed disinterested ... stockholders.., permits invocation of the
business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden
of proof upon the party attacking the transaction."); accord, Disney, 731 A.2d at 368 (Del.
Ch. 1998); see also Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336 ("In all events, informed, uncoerced,
disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have a
material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review
except on the basis of waste."); In re Wheelabrator Tech. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194,
1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[Tjhe operative effect of shareholder ratification in duty of loyalty
cases has been either to change the standard of review to the business judgment rule, with
the burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff, or to leave 'entire fairness' as the review
standard, but shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff.").
46. In assessing the impact of shareholder ratification and the elimination of any
fairness analysis, Delaware courts have gone so far as to allow advanced approval to
insulate an action under the duty of loyalty. In In re 3Com Corp. Shareholders Litigation
shareholders ratified a stock option plan. No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 25, 1999). Plaintiff challenged not the plan, but the award of options by an
interested board. Id. The court held that shareholder approval of the plan rendered the
duty of loyalty inapplicable. Id. at *11. In fact, the "precedent" cited by the court for this
proposition was not precedent at all. The court cited Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995
Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *11 n.10 (Del. Ch. July 18,1995). Most of the discussion in the case
involved an analysis of the impact of shareholder ratification on the plan itself, not awards
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largely ignoring the structure of section 144 and earlier law indicating
that section 144 affected voidability, not fairness.47  Moreover, they
have done so despite the fact that the requirement of disinterested
shareholder approval appears nowhere in the statute."'
In other cases involving transactions that fall outside of section
144, the courts have adopted a different approach, retaining a fairness
analysis." For conflicts of interest involving controlling
shareholders, ' a category not expressly covered by the provision,''
approval by disinterested shareholders shifts the burden of
demonstrating unfairness to the plaintiff." Courts explain the
under the plan. Id. at *22. Moreover, the awards appeared to be set, with no discretionary
authority by the board. The decision effectively removed from the duty of loyalty a
transaction involving a clear conflict of interest. 1d. at *32. The fact that the interested
board acted within plan parameters approved by shareholders did not eliminate the risk of
self-serving behavior and the need for a more exacting level of review. Id.
47. See supra note 41.
48. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993) (stating
that section 144(a)(2) required approval by "disinterested shareholders"). Recognizing
this, at least one court interpreting a comparable statute has suggested that shareholder
approval (rather than disinterested approval), even if by controlling shareholders, reduces
a claim to waste. See Camden v. Kaufman, 6.13 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Mich. App. 2000); see
also Dooley & Goldman, supra note 41, at 744.
49. Courts have, therefore, sometimes stretched to bring matters within the statute.
For example, although the provision requires that shareholders have "authorized,
approved or ratified" the transaction, Delaware courts have held that the tendering of
shares qualifies. See Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1176 (Del. 1995) (noting
that "the Court of Chancery properly found the tender by an overwhelming majority of
Technicolor's stockholders to be tacit approval").
50. The definition of "controlling" is narrowly drawn. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera
& Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989):
[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation's outstanding stocks
does not, without more, become a controlling shareholder of that corporation,
with a concomitant fiduciary status. For a dominating relationship to exist in the
absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination by a
minority shareholder through actual control of corporation conduct.
(quotations and citation omitted).
51. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
52. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (minority stockholder ratification "shifts the
burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs."); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (majority-of-the-minority shareholder
ratification of a parent-subsidiary merger will shift the burden to the plaintiff "to show
that the transaction was unfair to the minority."); Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 570
(Del. Ch. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 368 (Del. Ch.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ("In the context of disinterested
shareholder ratification of a deal between the corporation and a majority shareholder, the
trial court's deference manifests itself as a shift in the burden of persuasion under the
entire fairness standard."); In re Wheelabrator Tech. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203
(Del. Ch. 1995). But see Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971):
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differing treatment in the two types of transactions by noting the
inherent ability of controlling shareholders to influence the
outcome. 3 In the more limited context of a parent-subsidiary cash-
out merger, retention of a fairness analysis is sometimes justified by
the absence of the need for a business purpose for the transaction.
C. Criticism
The use of "disinterested" shareholder ratification to eliminate
fairness analysis raises two significant concerns. First, little real
justification exists for distinguishing classes of self-interested
transactions. Disinterested shareholder approval in non-controlling
shareholder cases results in application of a waste standard,
eliminating any consideration of fairness." For those transactions
On the contrary, the valuations of the property companies and the Marriott stock
were made by a majority of Marriott directors, whose independence is
unchallenged, based upon appraisals, analysis, information and opinions
provided by independent experts, whose qualifications are not questioned. In
these circumstances it cannot be said that the [controlling shareholder] stood "on
both sides of the transaction" within the meaning of the rule followed in the cases
above cited. Therefore, the test here applicable is that of business judgment,
there being no showing of fraud.
53. See Citron v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490,502 (Del. Ch. 1990):
Parent subsidiary mergers.., are proposed by a party that controls, and will
continue to control, the corporation, whether or not the minority stockholders
vote to approve or reject the transaction. The controlling stockholder
relationship has the inherent potential to influence, however subtly, the vote of
minority stockholders in a manner that is not likely to occur in a transaction with
a noncontrolling party.
The differing effects of disinterested shareholder approval appears to have been
accidental. In Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219 (Del. 1999), the court used
imprecise language when describing the effect of shareholder ratification. The court
applied a waste standard but on several occasions in the opinion stated that the burden
shifted to plaintiffs. In Weinberger, the court cited Michelson for the proposition that, in
the context of a controlling shareholder, ratification simply shifted the burden. 457 A.2d
at 703. The conclusion, therefore, appeared to be based upon a misreading of Michelson.
Only later did courts provide some type of independent justification for the distinction.
See also Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 ("The controlling stockholder relationship has the
potential to influence, however subtly, the vote of [ratifying] minority stockholders in a
manner that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling party." (quoting
Citron, 584 A.2d at 502)); Wheelabrator 11, 663 A.2d at 1205 (justifying application of
entire fairness standard even where shareholders ratify controlling shareholder
transactions because of overriding concerns that "the controlling stockholder's continued
presence might influence even a fully informed shareholder vote").
54. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 ("Thereafter, this Court recognized that it would be
inconsistent with its holding in Weinberger to apply the business judgment rule in the
context of an interested merger transaction which, by its very nature, did not require a
business purpose.").
55. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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involving controlling shareholders, approval merely shifts the burden
of proving fairness to the plaintiff."
Distinguishing these two types of transactions has little merit. In
general, disinterested shareholders will be influenced by the board of
directors. It is the board that submits the matter to shareholders.
Management has the corporate treasury at its disposal and the
attendant ability to spend conspicuous sums to obtain approval of the
interested transaction. 57 At the same time, shareholders suffer from
collective action problems," making concerted opposition difficult.
Moreover, disinterested opposition also risks retribution."s Without
the benefit of secret ballots, management will know the vote cast by
each "disinterested" shareholder.
The board's authority exists whether or not the transaction
involves a controlling shareholder." While a controlling shareholder
may sometimes influence other owners apart from the actions of the
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. Nor, in contrast with proxy contests, will someone independent of management
put before shareholders the other side of the transaction.
58. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("Thus the collective
nature of shareholder ratification makes it more likely that following a claimed
shareholder ratification, nevertheless, there is a litigated claim on behalf of the principal
that the agent lacked authority or breached its duty."); see also Brudney, supra note 5, at
218 ("The problems of collective action (free riders and rational apathy) among dispersed
shareholders fairly erode the volitional quality of consent obtained by the proxy process in
public corporations, particularly when the request for their approval is unopposed."). For
a discussion of collective action problems, see Jacobson, supra note 44, at 1018 n.208. The
article, however, suggests that the increased institutionalization of the market will alleviate
these problems. Whatever the trends in the market, the phenomena of increased
ownership by institutions does not apply to all companies under all circumstances. At a
minimum, therefore, the problem of collective action will always be present for some
companies.
59. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 904:
Shareholders also tend to vote for management because assertive shareholders
encounter management hostility. Managers can deny rebellious shareholders
valuable information. Bank trust departments hesitate to oppose managements
for fear of offending them as commercial clients. Although the managers of
issuer-sponsored pension funds are supposed to be independent, they can be
fired by the issuer's management and are, therefore, loathe to oppose its will.
Executives sometimes badger officers of other companies to pressure their fund
managers to approve anti-takeover measures. Even absent specific pressures,
fund managers know that executives dislike active shareholders, and, therefore,
the fund managers keep a low profile to protect themselves.
(footnotes omitted).
60. The term "control" includes "the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise." Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2002); Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (2002). It is sufficient to show an indirect means of influence. See Maher v.
Durango Metals, 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998).
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board, so can a well-positioned officer.6' The Disney litigation did not
involve a controlling shareholder, but did involve a powerful
executive officer and director who could presumably influence
disinterested shareholders.62 Since both controlling shareholders and
powerful officers have the ability to influence the voting process,
there seems to be no good reason to differentiate in the outcome of
shareholder approval in these two circumstances.
Consistent treatment, however, still leaves the applicable
standard unresolved. Disinterested shareholder approval ought to
have some type of sanitizing effect on the challenged behavior. A
number of reasons, however, militate against an approach that
accedes too much deference to the shareholder approval process and
limits claims to waste. As a practical matter, waste represents a
residual claim in duty of care cases, a substantive standard available
even if the procedural safeguards of the business judgment rule have
been met.
63
The focus of a claim for breach of the duty of care, however, is
mismanagement.' In contrast, fairness under the duty of loyalty
focuses on self-dealing. As a result, fairness "is not a function of
inattentiveness or lack of effort or bad judgment that seeks to benefit
stockholders. It derives solely from self-appropriative acts by which
management seeks to take for itself property or potential that would
otherwise belong to the corporation or its stockholders.
65
It would seem, therefore, that the application of a standard
regulating mismanagement would be wholly inapposite to situations
designed to limit self-serving behavior.
Courts replacing fairness with waste apparently do so out of the
belief that disinterested approval somehow eliminates the taint
associated with the conflict of interest. In fact, this is not the case.
Duty of care cases presuppose that the transaction involves no
conflict and, as a result, no ulterior motivation.66  In contrast,
disinterested shareholder approval of self-dealing concedes the
existence of a conflict of interest but excludes those with an interest
61. See supra notes 2-3.
62. In 1998, Michael Eisner, the CEO of Disney, beneficially owned 3.6 million shares,
less than one percent of the total outstanding shares. Proxy Statement, Walt Disney Co.
(May 4, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001039/0000898430-
98-001707.txt. Few would deny that Mr. Eisner exercised considerable control over
Disney. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 250 (Del. 2000).
63. Brudney, supra note 5, at 225.
64. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1980).
65. Brudney, supra note 5, at 225.
66. See sources cited supra note 23.
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from the final vote tally. 7 Interested directors and shareholders may
participate in the discussion, vote on the matter, and lobby others.
The directors with the conflict of interest may well have a role in
running the campaign designed to induce disinterested approval of
the transaction. Thus, unlike cases involving the duty of care, the
presence of an alternative motivation remains and the possibility that
it may influence the outcome cannot be eliminated.
In addition, some interested shares will likely be counted in the
disinterested total. Delaware law does not define "disinterested
6 9
67. Case law in the area has made clear that interested directors may participate; they
simply cannot be counted in the final total. See Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1153,
1156 (Del. 1995), affd, 663 A.2d 1t56, 1174 (Del. 1995):
In my opinion, a financial interest in a transaction that is material to one or more
directors less than a majority of those voting is "significant" for burden shifting
purposes (or is "instrumental" or "material under the second part of the
materiality standard") when the interested director controls or dominates the
board as a whole or when the interested director fails to disclose his interest in
the transaction to the board and a reasonable board member would have
regarded the existence of the material interest as a significant fact in the
evaluation of the proposed transaction.
(italics omitted). Similar to directors, no case has held that interested shareholders must
be excluded from participation.
68. See supra note 6. With respect to directors, Delaware law does not require the
exclusion of those with an interest in the outcome of the transaction, only that the action
receive approval of disinterested directors. Interested directors can, therefore, participate
in the discussion on the matter. See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del.
2002) ("A party alleging domination and control of a company's board of directors bears
the burden of proving such control by showing a lack of independence on the part of a
majority of the directors."); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002):
To rebut successfully business judgment presumptions in this manner, thereby
leading to the application of the entire fairness standard, a plaintiff must
normally plead facts demonstrating "that a majority of the director defendants
have a financial interest in the transaction or were dominated or controlled by a
materially interested director."
(citation omitted). Even if excluded, substantial uncertainty exists over whether
"disinterested" directors can truly act in an objective fashion when deciding matters
involving their fellow board members. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Approval by
Disinterested Directors, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 215, 216 (1995).
69. Definitions of a sort do exist in the RMBCA. Section 8.63(a) limits those eligible
to vote to "qualified shares." REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.63(a) (1984). The phrase
means any shares except those that, "to the knowledge, before the vote, of the secretary
(or other officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes), are beneficially
owned (or the voting of which is controlled) by a director who has a conflicting interest
respecting the transaction or a related person of the director, or both." Id. § 8.63(b)
(1984). "Related person" includes the following persons sharing the same house with the
director: the director's spouse or spouse's parent or sibling and the director's child,
grandchild, sibling or parent. In addition, related person includes any trust or estate in
which the director is a "substantial beneficiary" or where the director acts as executor,
trustee or other fiduciary. Id. § 8.60(3) (1984). The American Law Institute's formulation
has a similar framework. See I PRIN. CORP. Gov. § 1.23(b) (1993); see also id. § 1.03(a)(1)
(defining "associate" in a manner identical to "related person" under the RMBCA). As
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and the courts have not filled the gap."' Under any rational
interpretation, the definition should exclude shares owned by the
directors who are parties to the transaction." Other categories of
disqualified shares, however, are less clear. The definition used by
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") does not,
for example, exclude the shares held by a corporation where the
official with the conflict serves as director." As a result, either by the
courts or legislature, the definition of "disinterested" effectively rests
one commentator explained, "[t]he reason for the more limited test of interestedness for
shareholders is practical: the difficulty in the case of corporations with numerous
shareholders in making all the determinations required in deciding whether a shareholder
is interested." A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Duty of Loyalty in The ALI's Corporate
Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719, 728 (1984).
70. The trend in the case law suggests that a rigorous definition of "disinterested" will
not emerge. Perhaps the best example of result oriented, internally inconsistent analysis
of the concept of disinterested in the context of directors occurred in In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation, 731 A.2d 342, 356-60 (Del. Ch. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). In that case, the court concluded that, to be interested and under
the control of the CEO, a director had to receive from the company a material payment.
Id. Materiality was relative; it depended upon the particular wealth of the director. Id. at
356. The analysis raised concerns, particularly the possibility that a rich director would
never be interested since payments would invariably be immaterial. See id. At the same
time, however, the court also concluded that, as a matter of law, directors' fees never
resulted in a board member becoming interested. Id. at 357. The court applied this
approach to an elementary school principal sitting on the Disney board, despite the
apparent materiality of the payments. Id. at 360. In addition to the internal inconsistency
with the materiality, the analysis ignored the inflation in directors' fees. See, e.g., Reed
Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at
C3:
Enron directors certainly were well compensated. They are ranked seventh in
total remuneration in 2001 with $380,619 worth of cash and stock, according to a
director compensation study by Pearl Meyer & Partners, a New York based
compensation consulting firm, which based the rankings on the value of a
company's stock on the date of its annual meeting.
71. The definition in the RMBCA is limited to the director and shares controlled by
the director. See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.50. The definition was deliberately
made more narrow than the definition of "conflicting interest" transactions in section
8.60(1)(ii). It was also more narrowly drawn that the definition of non-qualified directors
in section 8.62(d). In explaining the distinction, the commentary noted that the director
typically "will have no control over those persons and how they vote." Id. § 8.63(b) cmt.
72. See id. § 8.63(b) cmt. ("There is, in reality, no reason to strip [the second
corporation] of their voting rights as shareholders, for in the usual commercial situation
they will vote in accordance with their own interests, which may well not coincide with the
personal interest of [the interested director]."). Thus, the shares of a controlling
shareholder are "qualified" even if the director with the conflict sits on the board and
owns 10% of the controlling shareholder. Id.; see also 1 PRIN. CORP. Gov. § 1.23 cmt.
(1993) (fact that interested director on boards of both companies does not automatically
make corporate shares interested).
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with management, with little likelihood that all interested groups will
be excluded.73
Even assuming an adequate definition, public companies
confront logistical problems in ensuring only disinterested shares are
counted. Management has no obligation to develop a system that
identifies all disinterested shares." With the rise of street name
accounts and other forms of beneficial ownership, companies do not
automatically know who owns the shares voted at a meeting.75
The disinterested approval process, therefore, allows for
participation of interested shareholders and directors, does not
adequately define "disinterested," and presents logistical problems
associated with tallying disinterested votes,7" all suggesting that the
73. Management has an incentive to make the definition as narrow as possible. Thus,
in Citron v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., the parent proposed a merger with the
subsidiary, contingent upon the approval by a "majority of the minority." 584 A.2d 490,
493 (Del. Ch. 1990). The "minority" included all shares other than those owned by the
parent. Id. Thus, they may have included shares owned by officers, directors or family
members of the parent. These were apparently not excluded. Similarly, in Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000), the board of Shorewood Packaging adopted
a bylaw requiring that shareholder initiated bylaw changes receive supermajority
approval. Id. at 297. In determining to change the percentage from 67% to 60%, the
board determined that 20% of the shares were interested, leaving 80% disinterested. Id.
at 315. Thus, a bylaw would have to obtain the "interested" shares and half of the
disinterested ones in order to pass. In making the calculation, the board included in the
category of "interested" a shareholder that had sold much of its holdings to the acquiror
(but still had some shares remaining) and did not include the shares held by the directors
themselves. As the court noted: "The most fundamental flaw in the board's reasoning
[supporting the supermajority provision] is the disparate treatment the board gave their
own self-interest." Id. at 341.
74. See 1 PRIN. CORP. Gov. § 1.23 cmt. (1993) ("When seeking shareholder approval,
the corporation is not obliged to determine whether shareholders are interested, although
it may do so."). The RMBCA has only slightly more. The Model Act requires the
exclusion of shares only where the tabulator knows they were owned or controlled by a
director with a conflict of interest. Thus, the tabulator must have "actual knowledge" of
the ownership. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.63(b) cmt. 2. Despite the high
standard, the provision does little to ensure that the tabulator will have the requisite
knowledge. The only affirmative requirement is that directors with a conflict have an
obligation to notify the secretary. Id. § 8.63(d). Thus, neither the company nor the
tabulator have any independent obligation to ascertain the existence of interested shares.
Moreover, to the extent interested shares are improperly included in the total, "the vote
cannot be attacked on that ground." Id. § 8.63(d) cmt.
75. See supra note 7. For a more complete discussion of problems associated with
beneficial ownership, see J. Robert Brown, The Shareholder Communication Rules and the
Securities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J.
Corp. L. 683 (1988).
76. Most, if not all, of these factors are typically absent in the context of disinterested
director approval. Moreover, disinterested directors have fiduciary obligations that
govern their decisions and, in most cases, have more information than what is provided to
disinterested shareholders. Thus, the two groups are not on an equal footing when asked
to approve a conflict of interest transaction.
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taint of the conflict of interest cannot be treated as dissipated.77
Moreover, use of the business judgment rule results in the application
of a standard designed to protect directors from mismanagement and
risk-taking, not self-dealing. All of these factors militate against a
rule that replaces fairness with waste.7
II. The Myth of Informed Approval
A more serious concern, however, supports the retention of
fairness analysis, even after approval by "disinterested
shareholders." Disinterested approval presupposes full disclosure of
all material information. However, Delaware courts have opted for a
definition of "fully informed" that does not ensure shareholders have
all material information. Inadequate information raises the risk that
shareholders will approve an unfair transaction.
Delaware courts consistently refuse to require disclosure of
material information in at least two critical circumstances. In the
context of mergers or sale of the business, the board may have
information suggesting alternative valuations to the one offered
shareholders. This occurs most often where the company has
received other offers or has calculated values using alternative
formulas. The information may suggest the possibility of a higher
price, something shareholders would presumably want to know.8'
Delaware courts routinely characterize the information as immaterial,
concluding that suggestions of a higher price would only "confuse"
investors.
77. See also Brudney, supra note 5, at 222 ("Stockholder approval ... embodies small
consensual value in view of the problematic independence of disinterested directors, and
the thin informational base and rational apathy from which such decisions by dispersed
stockholders are constructed.").
78. The RMBCA goes even further and eliminates all causes of action following
disinterested shareholder approval, including waste. See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b)(2) (following shareholder approval, a transaction "may not be enjoined, set
aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions"). As the commentary notes,
a director is not "legally vulnerable" following approval. Id. § 8.61(b) cmt. 2.
79. Of course, directors also must be informed when making decisions. For cases
addressing this issue, see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Wisconsin
Investment Board v. Bartlett, No. 17,727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2000); and In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 731 A.2d 342, 366-67 (Del. Ch.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
80. Some have noted that the proxy system itself provides far less information than is
available to fiduciaries when making a decision. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 218.
81. See infra notes 173-174; 226-238 and accompanying text.
82. See Goodwin v. Live Entm't, No. 15,765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *38 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 22, 1999) ("The risk that an unreliable analysis could lead stockholders to reject a
good deal based on the false hope that a better deal was around the corner is one a board
must consider in assessing whether to disclose."); see also Brown v. Perrette, No. 13531,
1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1999) ("[D]isclosure of a single
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In other circumstances, the courts have consistently refused to
require disclosure of facts suggesting improper behavior or conflicts
of interest by management, characterizing them as unnecessary "self-
flagellation."" Self-flagellation subsumes the widely accepted view
that directors do not have to characterize corporate behavior as
mismanagement, as a violation of law, or in any other negative
fashion. Delaware courts have gone much further and used the self-
flagellation doctrine to encompass wide swathes of factual data that
suggest potential conflicts of interest or improper behavior. "
Analysis of the disclosure regime entails more than a subjective
evaluation of Delaware cases. Federal courts have also interpreted
the meaning of material information under the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws. 5 Both rely upon the identical definition of
materiality. Although using the same language and the same
standards, Delaware courts are in fact more willing to characterize as
immaterial information that would likely be considered material
under the federal standard.
A. Evolution
The state law obligation to keep shareholders informed arose in
Delaware accidentally. At one time, a statute expressly prohibited
publication by a corporation of any written statement "that [was
knowingly] false in any material respect.""6 The provision imposed no
affirmative disclosure obligations but did require accuracy and
completeness once disclosure occurred. In characterizing the
requirement, 7 the Delaware Supreme Court found that a company
unadorned fact can quickly snowball into wide-ranging disclosure of facts and opinions
that otherwise would never come before the shareholders.").
83. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997); Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del. 1992); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218-19 (Del.
1979).
84. See infra notes 141-55, and accompanying text.
85. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
86. 21 Del. Laws 451 (1898). The provision was repealed in 1967. For an extensive
and thoughtful discussion of the development of the duty of candor, see Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure
Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996).
87. See Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, 146 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1958); see
also Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 71 (Del. Ch. 1969) (relying on Hall to conclude that
"directors owe a duty to honestly disclose all material facts when they undertake to give
out statements about the business to stockholders"). Two earlier cases involved
allegations of misleading disclosure. Neither, however, represented a true duty of candor
case. See Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 594 (Del. Ch. 1958) (failure to disclose conflict
of interest: issue turned upon whether shareholders were fully informed for purposes of
validating conflict under duty of loyalty); Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 46 A.2d 741,
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had an obligation to ensure that documents distributed to
shareholders "honestly" disclosed all material information.' The
statute, however, was eventually repealed.
The modern impetus for the requirement of full disclosure
occurred in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.89 In that case, Vickers, a
controlling shareholder of TransOcean, made a tender offer for the
remaining shares of the company. " After tendering her shares,
plaintiff filed suit alleging that Vickers had failed to make full and
frank disclosure of the value of TransOcean's assets.' The Supreme
Court concluded that Vickers had affirmative disclosure obligations
under a duty of "complete candor." 2 The duty required the court:
to examine what information defendants had and to measure it
against what they gave to the minority stockholders, in a context in
which "complete candor" is required. In other words, the limited
function of the Court was to determine whether defendants had
disclosed all information in their possession germane to the
transaction in issue. And by "germane" we mean, for present
purposes, information such as a reasonable shareholder would
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock. The
objective, of course, is to prevent insiders from using special
knowledge which they may have to their own advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders. 3
In applying the standard, the court found that Vickers violated
the duty by omitting to disclose asset valuations showing the
approximate value of each share to be $20."
In explaining the source of the disclosure requirements, Lynch
focused on the fiduciary nature of the obligation, suggesting that the
doctrine arose out of a majority shareholder's fiduciary obligations
and the duty of loyalty.'5 Subsequent decisions suggested that the
748 (Del. Ch. 1946) (concluding that nonmanagement shareholders could not state in a
proxy solicitation that the board had approved their acts).
88. See Hall, 146 A.2d at 610; see also Kelly, 254 A.2d at 71.
89. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
90. Id. at 279.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 281 (citations omitted). In defining what must be disclosed, the court
extended the requirement only to "germane" information. Id. Germane suggested a
standard different from materiality. Later cases, however, expressly adopted the
materiality standard used by federal courts. See infra note 128. Had that interpretation
remained in place, Delaware courts would have found themselves free of direct
comparison with the federal standard.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 279.
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obligation of complete candor and honesty could arise out of either
the duty of loyalty or the duty of care. 6
The fiduciary basis of the doctrine had a number of implications.
Most significantly, the duty extended to the directors or other
fiduciaries, not to the corporation. 7 Thus, unlike the federal system,
Delaware courts refused to impose liability directly on the entity that
actually made the statement. Moreover, a breach of fiduciary
obligations (at least the duty of care) under state law theoretically
required a lower level of fault than under Rule 10b-5 of the federal
96. See Zirn v. VL Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993) (duty to disclose in a merger
arises out of both duty of care and loyalty); see also Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1166 (noting
that duty of candor arose out of a "combination of the duty of care and loyalty"); Wolf v.
Assaf, No. 15339, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1998) (duty of
candor can arise under duty of care or loyalty).
97. Rule lOb-5 applies to the person making the statement, which, in the corporate
context, is usually the corporation. Liability can also extend to those who actually
prepared the statement and otherwise had substantial involvement in the drafting process.
See BROWN, supra note 7, § 2.03[4] (Supp. 2003). With the elimination of aiding and
abetting liability, however, this represents a relatively narrow category of individuals. See
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). For a discussion of
primary liability under the antifraud provisions, see BROWN, supra note 7, § 10.02 (Supp.
2002).
98. See Arnold v. Soc'y for Savings Bancorp, 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del 1996) (declining
to allow breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure claim against corporation rather than
directors). The fiduciary basis of the doctrine has important consequences. Many of the
cases have involved third-party tender offers. In general, bidders have no affirmative state
law disclosure obligations, at least in the absence of control over the target company. See
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989). Of course, a
bidder may need to comply with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.
See Rules 14d-1-14e-7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1-240.14e7 (2002). Similarly, management
has no disclosure obligations with respect to inaccurate statements by third parties. See
Citron, 569 A.2d at 70 (noting that board had no responsibility for alleged nondisclosure in
shareholder offer "absent some proof that the two boards engaged in joint conduct to
mislead the shareholders"); see also Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $$ 93,608, 97,729 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) ("However, I am aware of no Delaware
case that holds corporate directors accountable for the quality of disclosure in a third
party's offer to purchase."). The Delaware courts have, however, recognized theories of
secondary liability that could hold these companies responsible. See Sonet v. Plum Creek
Timber Co., No. 16931, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49, at **24-25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1999)
("When controlling persons seek shareholder approval of a transaction, they have a
fiduciary duty to honestly provide full and fair disclosure of all material facts relating to
that transaction."); In re Shoe-Town Stockholders Litig., No. 9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS
14, at **22-23 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990); see also Solash, [1987-19981 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 93,608, 97,730 ("In any case, it is well established that the one who knowingly
participates with a fiduciary and a breach of trust renders himself liable to the injured
beneficiary."). An unrelated third party may, however, have an obligation of
completeness arising not from a fiduciary relationship but from equitable fraud which gave
rise to detrimental reliance. Zirn, 621 A.2d at 777.
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securities laws:" gross negligence' rather than reckless or intentional
conduct.'0 '
As the doctrine developed, Delaware courts divided over a
number of issues. It was initially unclear whether the obligation of
complete honesty amounted to an extension of the traditional duties
of care and loyalty or was a free-standing duty under the board's
general fiduciary obligations."'2 Similarly, while the doctrine extended
to instances of shareholder action, its application to press releases and
other materials disclosed to the market remained uncertain.' 3
The Delaware Supreme Court resolved some of these issues in
Malone v. Brincat.' Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that
directors of Mercury Finance violated their fiduciary duty of candor
by overstating the financial condition of the company for a four-year
period." The company ultimately became insolvent, costing
investors more than $2 billion." Plaintiffs alleged that the directors
"knowingly and intentionally" breached their fiduciary duty of
disclosure.
The lower court dismissed the claim, concluding that a fiduciary
duty to disclose did not exist absent a request for shareholder
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The rule was adopted under section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (2000).
100. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000).
101. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). For a discussion of the
cases interpreting the scienter requirement in the aftermath of the adoption of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, see BROWN, supra note 7, § 1.04[2][[e] (Supp. 2002).
Whether in practice there is much of a difference in the two standards remains unclear.
102. See Zirn, 621 A.2d at 782 (referring to duty as a "fiduciary duty of candor.").
103. See Uni-Marts ex rel. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores v. Stein, LEXIS 95 n.10
(Del. Ch. August 10, 1996) (duty did not apply in absence of shareholder action and cases
cited therein). For a time, only one Delaware court had extended the doctrine to market
information. In Marhart, Inc. v. CalMat Co., [1991-1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 96,655, 93,098, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 330 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992), defendants allegedly
issued a misleading press release. Id. at 333. As part of the defense, they argued that they
could not violate any fiduciary duty since the disclosure had not been issued in connection
with the transactions requiring stockholder action. Id. at 335. The court, however,
disagreed with the reasoning. "It is entirely consistent with the settled principle of law
that fiduciaries who undertake the responsibility of informing stockholders about
corporate affairs, be required to do so honestly." Id. at 336; see also Ciro, Inc. v. Gold, 816
F. Supp. 253, 266 (D. Del. 1993) ("It is also well-established Delaware law that once
directors voluntarily undertake to make certain disclosures to the stockholders, they are
obligated under the so-called duty of complete candor, to disclose all material facts. This
duty arises even when voluntary disclosure is made by the directors and no shareholder
action in reliance thereon is requested or contemplated.").
104. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id.
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action.'"  The Delaware Supreme Court, however, reversed. The
court found that the disclosure obligations "did not operate
intermittently" and concluded that the directors had an obligation to
speak honestly when issuing public statements available to
shareholders. 9
Whenever directors communicate publicly or directly with
shareholders about the corporation's affairs, with or without a
request for shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty. It follows
a fortiori that when directors communicate publicly or directly with
shareholders about corporate matters the sine qua non of directors'
fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty.'"
Shareholders, therefore, had a right to rely on the honesty of
communications emanating from the board. Moreover, the duty was
not a free standing obligation but arose under the obligation of
loyalty and care."' The context of the suit, however, mattered. In the
case of a request for shareholder action, the disclosure claim had to
be maintained as a derivative suit. The suit could be brought without
proof of reliance, causation, or actual monetary damages. It was
enough to establish the materiality of the information."2 Materiality
had to be determined with reference to the specific matter to be
decided by shareholders.
Although imposing an almost absolute duty to reveal all material
information in the context of shareholder action, Malone built in a
defense."3 The duty to disclose had to be balanced against the
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id. at 11.
110. Id. at 10; see also Weiss v. Samsonite Corp., 741 A.2d 366, 374 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(directors have a duty "honestly to provide full and fair disclosure of all material facts
relating to" the transaction to be approved by shareholders).
11l. Delaware courts have made clear that the duty to disclose is not a free standing
fiduciary obligation but a subset of the traditional duties of care, loyalty and good faith.
See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001) ("We begin by observing that
the board's fiduciary duty of disclosure, like the board's duties under Revlon and its
progeny, are not independent duties but the application in a specific context of the board's
fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty."); Crescent/Mach I Partners v. Turner, No.
17455, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 145, at *60 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2000) ("The fiduciary duty of
disclosure arises as a subset of a director's fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.").
112. See In re Tri-Star Pictures Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 327 n.10 (Del. 1993); Grubb v.
Babley, No. 13802-NC, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 30, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1998) ("Delaware
law is settled that there is no reliance requirement in a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty
of disclosure.").
113. At one level, Malone represented an easy case to parse. The court reaffirmed that,
in the context of shareholder approval, the only issue was materiality. 722 A.2d at 20. See
also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999) ("When stockholder
action is requested, directors are required to provide shareholders with all information
that is material to the action being requested and 'to provide a balanced, truthful account
of all matters disclosed in the communications with shareholders."' (citation omitted)).
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board's "concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in
particular, by keeping certain financial information confidential."'
1 4
Thus, directors only had an obligation to provide a "balanced,
truthful account of all matters disclosed in the communications with
shareholders.""' 5 Whatever the language meant precisely, it was clear
that the court anticipated that confidentiality would sometimes take
precedent over disclosure."6
With respect to non-derivative actions, Malone refused to
duplicate federal law by recognizing a fraud-on-the-market theory of
reliance. 7 Instead, actual reliance would be required, limiting the
number of possible plaintiffs in any given action.' 8 The holding made
class actions-a staple at the federal level-all but impossible.
Similarly, by negative implication, elements of a non-derivative claim
would be substantially more difficult than a derivative action,
requiring both proof of damages and an elevated state of mind." 9
Moreover, the obligation of complete honesty arose in this context, whether or not the
approval involved self-dealing. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342,
369 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("The duty of disclosure is now recognized whenever the Board seeks
shareholder action, regardless of whether the approval sought is for an act or transaction
in which the board itself is conflicted."). Nonetheless, the presence of a conflict of
interest, while not altering the standard, may invite heightened scrutiny. See Sonet v.
Plum Creek Timber Co., No. 16931, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49, at *25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18,
1999) ("In that context [conflict of interest], the materiality standard remains unchanged,
but the scrutiny of the disclosures made in that context is more exacting."). This did little
more than reaffirm that shareholder approval had to be premised upon complete
information.
114. Malone, 722 A.2d at 21. The company did have to provide "all information that is
material" and a "balanced truthful account of all matters." Id. At one time a few federal
cases suggested a business judgment exception at the federal level. See BROWN, supra
note 7, § 6.01[3][a] (Supp. 1999).
115. Malone, 722 A.2d at 12.
116. The court may have been building in a business judgment defense to inadequate
disclosure. See Fin. Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
117. For a discussion of fraud on the market, see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988).
118. The courts will have to wrestle with the obvious difficulty in establishing reliance
in an omission context. In the context of Rule l0b-5, federal courts have opted for a
presumption of reliance. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
119. As the court noted, "directors who knowingly disseminate false information that
results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their fiduciary
duty .... Malone, 722 A.2d at 9. As for the source, the obligation of honesty did not
arise as an independent duty. Instead, the Court noted that the need for honesty
amounted to "a specific application of the general fiduciary duty owed by directors." Id.
at 10. In the context of Mercury Financial, therefore, the issue was whether the directors
breached "their more general fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by knowingly
disseminating to the stockholders false information ..... Id. Said another way,
inaccurate disclosure could result in a "violation of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or
good faith." Id. at 11. See also Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 n.9 (Del.
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B. Implications
Despite some confusing analysis, Malone reemphasized the
fiduciary nature of the requirement of complete candor and
honesty.' Although the case involved allegations of false disclosure
under the duty of loyalty,2' the court made clear the obligation could
also arise under the duty of care.'22 Moreover, companies had an
obligation of complete honesty anytime they communicated in a
manner that would reach shareholders. The duty was not limited to
communications involving shareholder action. '23
Nonetheless, the practical effect of Malone was to limit claims for
inadequate disclosure to derivative suits involving shareholder
approval of matters implicating the duty of loyalty. The difficulty in
showing individualized harm meant that actions for false disclosure
would likely be limited to derivative suits. Similarly, derivative suits
alleging false disclosure in the non-shareholder approval context
confronted the difficulty in showing harm to the corporation.'
24
1995) ("This Court has recently held that a violation of the duty of disclosure is not
necessarily a breach of the duty of loyalty.").
120. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10.
121. Id. at 14 ("The issue in this case is not whether Mercury's directors breached their
duty of disclosure. It is whether they breached their more general fiduciary duty of loyalty
and good faith by knowingly disseminating to the stockholders false information about the
financial condition of the company.").
122. The court characterized the board's duty as one of care, loyalty, and good faith.
Id. at 11. Presumably, therefore, the obligation to speak honestly could sometimes arise
under the duty of good faith. The court provided no explanation of how this would occur.
123. Malone went beyond Rule 10b-5 in one significant respect. Under that reasoning,
a suit could be maintained by injured shareholders, whether purchasers or sellers. See id.
at 13. ("Here it is to be noted, the claim appears to be made by those who did not sell and,
therefore, would not implicate federal securities laws which relate to the purchase or sale
of securities."). Thus, those fraudulently induced to retain their shares would presumably
have a cause of action. In the context of shareholder action, the court suggested that a
plaintiff need only establish the materiality of the omitted or misstated information. See
id. at 12. While that might suffice for an injunction seeking supplemental disclosure, it
would presumably not be enough in an action for damages. See Brown v. Perrette, No.
13531, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1999) "[Pllaintiff seeking
recovery for breach of the duty of disclosure must set forth the shareholder's economic
interest or voting right harmed by the breach and request damages commensurate with the
harm.").
124. A derivative suit could also be brought for market disclosure in the absence of
shareholder action. The claim would, by negative implication, require proof of reliance,
causation, materiality and "actual quantifiable monetary damages." Malone, 722 A.2d at
12. Shareholders would presumably have to show harm to the corporation. This may not
be an easy matter. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Disclosure Duties: New Law and New Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1999, at 5 ("Where fraudulent statements enable the corporation to raise
funds, attract customers, gain credit from suppliers, or acquire other firms, the conduct
may be egregious, but damages are typically lacking."). Fluctuations in share prices would
probably not be enough since they do not necessarily result in harm to the company.
Fines imposed as a result of false disclosure or other types of special damages might
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As a practical matter, therefore, actions for false disclosure
would be the most viable only in the derivative context and only when
the company was requesting some sort of shareholder action. For
derivative actions implicating the duty of care, the universal presence
of liability waiver provisions in the articles of incorporation meant
that recovery of damages would have little likelihood of success."'
Damages would only be possible in a meaningful sense in actions
involving inadequate disclosure to shareholders asked to approve
transactions involving the duty of loyalty.'26
III. Full Disclosure and the Duty of Loyalty
A. Materiality Defined
In ensuring adequate information, the doctrine of complete
candor and honesty prohibits "[m]isleading partial disclosure" 27 and,
suffice. Id. With respect to individual actions for false disclosure, the court indicated that
such a suit was possible, but with limitations. For an example of a cause of action brought
on behalf of a single shareholder see Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377
(Del. Ch. 1999). Noting the traditional role of the federal securities laws in regulating
disclosure to the market, the Court declined to permit an action based upon "fraud on the
market." Malone, 722 A.2d at 12-13. As a result, actual reliance would be the order of
the day, eliminating the possibility of a large class action. Moreover, the shareholder
would need to show a direct, rather than derivative, injury. See Jackson, 741 A.2d at 389
(enough to plead that omission was important to "consideration of its rights under the
Certificate and that the communicating director or directors could not have reasonably
concluded otherwise."). In the case of the directors of Mercury Financial, the allegations
involved the knowing dissemination of materially false information. See id. at 7, 9. The
loss of "virtually all of its equity" seemed to "obliquely claim an injury to the
corporation." Malone, 722 A.2d at 14. Thus, the case appeared to be a derivative action,
something that required pre-suit demand on the board. Plaintiffs would have to determine
whether the cause of action was direct or derivative, an often subtle distinction. See
Parnes v. Bally, 788 A.2d 131 (Del. 2001); Grimes v. Donald, 755 A.2d 388 (Del. 2000),
affd, 784 A.2d 1080 (Del. 2001) (decision without published opinion). Alternatively, the
case could be replead as an action on behalf of an individual or a properly recognizable
class. To plead the matter as a class, the plaintiffs would have to overcome the language in
Gaffin v. Teledyne, 611 A.2d 467, 474 (Del. 1992), that fraud cases were not properly
brought as a class action because the element of justifiable reliance would "inevitably"
predominate over common questions of law and fact.
125. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see also Arnold v. Sec'y for Sav.
Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1287 (Del. 1994) ("In the instant case, plaintiff's claim that
section 102(b)(7) does not extend to disclosure violations must be rejected as contrary to
the express, unambiguous language of that provision."). The provision applies to liability
and does not preclude injunctive or other types of relief.
126. The Delaware Code specifically bars waiver of liability in the case of a breach of
the duty of loyalty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). See also Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1227 (Del. 1999); Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No.
17272, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2000).
127. See Weiss v. Samsonite Corp., 741 A.2d 366, 374 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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in some cases, "literally true statements" if materially incomplete.2 '
Although extending to common stockholders, ' there still exists an
issue about the applicability of the obligation of full disclosure to
preferred shareholders, at least those without voting rights.'3 The
duty does not apply to debt holders.'3
128. See Sonet v. Plum Creek Timber Co., No. 16931, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 49 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 18, 1999).
129. The materiality standard also applies to directors, although the difference in the
decision making process means that the information necessary to make an informed
decision will vary. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.49 (Del. 2000).
The term "material" is used in this context to mean relevant and of a magnitude
to be important to directors in carrying out their fiduciary duty of care in
decisionmaking. In this sense, it is distinct from the use of the term "material" in
the quite different context of disclosure to stockholders in which an omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. See Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 741 A.2d 377, 389-90 (Del. Ch. 1999).
Whatever uncertainty has been suggested by the courts, the duty to disclose honestly
would seem to apply with equal vigor to non-voting preferred shareholders. First, the
Delaware courts have long accepted that the duty applied in contexts not involving voting
rights, such as the decision to tender or not tender shares. Id. at 390. Second, Malone
clarified that the doctrine applied to any public disclosure. Id. at 389; Malone v. Brincat,
722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998). In neither instance does the presence or absence of voting
rights seem to matter.
131. See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
Doubt exists about the application of the doctrine to purchasers, at least those not already
shareholders. In SEC v. Dirks, the Supreme Court made clear that insider trading was
fundamentally premised upon fiduciary duty principles. 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983). Thus,
disclosure obligations did not extend to non-shareholder purchasers. Nonetheless, no
court has been willing to dismiss insider trading cases due to the absence of a fiduciary
duty to purchasers. See Debartolo Group v. Jacobs Group, 186 F.3d 157, 169 n.5 (2d Cir.
1999) ("For purposes of insider trading, it does not matter whether the insider is buying
from an existing shareholder or selling to an entity who then becomes a shareholder.").
See also Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951) (Hand, J.) ("It would be a sorry
distinction to allow [an insider] to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer
into the position of a beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had
become one."). The two read in tandem suggest that fiduciary obligations apply to
imminent shareholders, i.e., those about to purchase. Nonetheless, the approach is
accidental and make-weight. Neither In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), nor
Dirks explained how fiduciary duty principles could extend to non-shareholders. Cady
Roberts is probably correct, therefore, in the holding that disclosure obligations under the
antifraud provisions extend to purchasers. If no duty applied to purchasers, insiders could
sell to them knowing that share prices would fall without breaching fiduciary obligations
and violating the prohibitions on insider trading. It is the analysis in Dirks, which
premises these obligations on fiduciary duty principles, that is suspect. The reasoning in
this area is less a matter of compelling logic and more a matter of accident. Moreover, as a
practical matter, courts are simply unwilling to exonerate fiduciaries in insider transactions
with non-shareholder purchasers. Delaware courts will, therefore, need to address a
similar concern. To the extent arising under fiduciary duty principals, the duty of honesty
and completeness would not extend to purchasers who did not already own shares.
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Delaware courts have expressly adopted the federal definition of
materiality.'32 Thus, information will be material under Delaware law
where there is:
a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made
available. T
As under Rule 10b-5, Delaware courts have noted that
materiality amounts to a mixed question of law and fact,14 to be
determined by objective standards.'39 Materiality is examined from
the perspective of shareholders, not directors.'
132. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858, 890 (Del. 1985). But see In re
Transworld Airlines S'holders Litig., No. 9844(con.), 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *27 n.2
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (noting that the standard for disclosure under state and federal
securities laws is "essentially the same," but "[t]he similarity is not exact"). As one court
noted, the test was comparable "to the test applied by federal courts when treating
disclosure under the federal securities laws." Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517
A.2d 271, 279 (Del. Ch. 1986). The federal definition appears in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
133. Roberts v. General Instrument, No. 11639, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 138, at **29-30
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); see also Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 779 (Del. 1993);
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) ("Moreover, it is clear from the
Delaware cases that the materiality standard of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.... applies."); Weiss v. Samsonite Corp., 741 A.2d 366, 374 (Del. Ch. 1999) (defining
materiality standard as "substantial likelihood" that omitted facts would "significantly
alter[] the 'total mix' of information" and would assume "actual significance in a
reasonable stockholders' deliberations.").
134. See Weinberger v. Rio Grande Industries, 519 A.2d 116 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also
Zirn, 621 A.2d at 778-79; Glassman v. Wometco Cable TV, No. 7307, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 1, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1989) ("The materiality of non-disclosed facts is a mixed
question of law and fact and as such is not usually an appropriate issue for resolution by
summary judgment." (citation omitted)).
135. See Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779. Materiality includes information mandated by statute.
See Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, No. 13618, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80, at *17 (Del. Ch. July
5, 1995) ("In my view, any argument that the erroneous inclusion of a page from another
state's appraisal statute was 'immaterial' is foreclosed by the mandatory nature of the
statutory requirement.").
136. Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779 ("[T]he focus is on what a reasonable investor would
consider important in tendering his stock, not what a director considers important."); see
also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 at 88 (Del. 1995) (noting that
test for materiality is objective, "determined from the perspective of the reasonable
shareholder, not that of the directors or other party who undertakes to distribute
information").
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B. Immaterial Material Information
Perhaps a majority of the reported cases in Delaware involving
issues of complete candor and honesty have focused on two areas.
One concerns the obligation to disclose conflicts of interest and illegal
activity. ' Courts routinely refuse to require such disclosure, likening
the obligation to "self-flagellation." The other involves information
about alternative valuations.' Whether a merger, tender offer or
other sale of the business, Delaware courts routinely refuse to require
disclosure of information suggesting a higher valuation than the price
offered.' -9
To justify nondisclosure, courts have often relied on a balancing
test that weighs the benefits of disclosure against the harm of
inundating shareholders with unnecessary information.' 4  Thus,
materiality cannot be so broad as to bury "shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information" or otherwise cause investor
confusion.'4 ' Such an approach amounts to a tacit acknowledgment
that investors would find the information useful but provides for
exclusion because the harm outweighs the benefits. The test does not
comport with usual notions of materiality, which merely focus on the
significance of the information to investors.'
42
137. See sources cited supra note 87.
138. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000); In re Unocal
Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 352 (Del. Ch. 2000).
139. Courts have refused to do so even where they have recognized that it might be
"good policy." Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that while it
might be "good public policy" to disclose to shareholders the value of options as
compensation to officers and directors, "it does not follow that the fiduciary duty of
corporate directors is the appropriate instrument to determine and implement sound
public policy with respect to this technical issue").
140. See, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1128 (Del. Ch. 1999):
The determination of the materiality of an alleged omission or misstatement
"requires a careful balancing of the potential benefits of disclosure against the
resultant harm." The theory goes that there is a risk of information overload
such that shareholders' interests are best served by an economy of words rather
than an overflow of adjectives and adverbs in solicitation statements.
(citing Arnold v. Sec'y for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (footnotes omitted).
141. 747 A.2d at 1130 (quoting Behrens v. United Investors Mgmt., No. 12876, 1993
Del. Ch. LEXIS 217, at 33 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 1993). The reference to an "avalanche of
trivial information" also sometimes appears in federal cases. At least as used by the
Supreme Court, however, the phrase is not a justification for excluding information
important to reasonable investors, but instead has been used to determine the appropriate
test for materiality. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 US 438, 448 (1976)
(rejecting lower court standard that held materiality encompassed information which
"might" be important to a reasonable investor).
142. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) ("The role of the materiality
requirement is not to 'attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to grasp the
probabilistic significance of negotiations,' but to filter out essentially useless information




The duty of complete honesty does not require companies to
characterize facts as acts of mismanagement or violations of the law.'43
Said another way, a company does not have to disclose "[m]ere
speculation" or "a legal conclusion."'44  Courts in Delaware have
inartfully labeled this the "self-flagellation" doctrine.'
In many respects, the doctrine is unremarkable. Courts agree
that notions of materiality do not require that management
pejoratively characterize circumstances.' Nonetheless, the doctrine
traditionally did not absolve companies from disclosing underlying
facts that suggested a conflict of interest or improper behavior,
thereby enabling shareholders to draw their own conclusions.'
Delaware courts, however, have broadened the ban on pejorative
characterizations to encompass the surrounding facts.'
that a reasonable investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger 'mix' of
factors to consider in making his investment decision." (citations omitted)).
143. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997) ("The
directors' duty of disclosure does not oblige them to characterize their conduct in such a
way as to admit wrongdoing."); Bragger v. Budacz, No. 13376, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202,
at *21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1994) ("Yet it is well settled that directors need not in their
disclosure document admit plaintiffs' claims to be true; they need not engage in
confessions of contested positions.").
144. See Tuckman v. Aerosonic Corp., No. 4094, 1982 Del. Ch. LEXIS 452, at *34 (Del.
Ch. May 20, 1982). The same approach applies to motivations. In general, they need not
be stated affirmatively, although a misstatement may be actionable. This is largely the
holding in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). See also Herd v.
Major Realty Corp., No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990).
145. Delaware courts apparently used the appellation for the first time in Stroud v.
Grace.
We recognize the long-standing principle that to comport with its fiduciary duty
to disclose all relevant material facts, a board is not required to engage in "self-
flagellation" and draw legal conclusions implicating itself in a breach of fiduciary
duty from surrounding facts and circumstances prior to a formal adjudication of
the matter.
606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del. 1992). In fairness, the phrase was used even earlier by a federal
court. See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 873 (2d Cir. 1974).
With respect to the federal courts, however, the phrase has not become an appellation for
the doctrine.
146. See BROWN, supra note 7, § 3.03[5][b] (Supp. 2000).
147. The doctrine first arose in Stroud, 606 A.2d 75. In that case, the court recognized
that companies had no obligation to "engage in 'self-flagellation' and draw legal
conclusions implicating itself in a breach of fiduciary duty from surrounding facts and
circumstances prior to a formal adjudication of the matter." Id. at 84 n.1. At the same
time, however, they were obligated to "disclose[] all material facts relevant to the issue at
hand." Id.
148. Thus, for example, in Loudon, plaintiffs alleged that directors violated the duty of
complete honesty by failing to reveal the facts surrounding the resignation of a director.
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In Wolf v. Assaf, the court declined to find material information
indicating that the chairman knew about improper accounting
treatment.'9 Shareholders had filed a suit against the company
alleging securities fraud based in part upon improper accounting
practices. In the action, the chairman admitted that he had known
about the accounting irregularities.'"' Plaintiff alleged that the
chairman's awareness should have been disclosed in the proxy
materials and that the failure to disclose violated his obligation of
candor. 5'
In dismissing the allegations, the Court of Chancery
characterized the claims as requiring management to engage in "self-
flagellation" and require them to disclose facts that would arguably
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.52
700 A.2d at 135. The proxy statement contained no information explaining the reasons for
a director's resignation. Id. According to plaintiff, the director had resigned because of
his opposition to perceived wrongdoing by the board. Id. Describing the approach as "a
novel disclosure theory," the court declined to find the omitted information material:
To be sure, it might be "better practice" for directors of a public corporation to
be more candid and forthcoming in their communications to stockholders when
presenting a slate for election to the board. It is a leap of logic, however, for this
Court, applying a form of "common law" of corporate disclosure, to fashion a
rule that attempts to draw-in a liability context-a bright line of disclosure for
directorial elections. How much information must be imparted to the
stockholders concerning positions previously taken by directors who have been
dropped from the management slate? When can it be said that omitted
information about a former director's disagreement with management rises to
the level of a "substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a
reasonable shareholder"? What is plaintiff's theory of causation and economic
damage to him and other stockholders?
Id. at 144 (citations omitted). The court's use of rhetorical questions was odd. The same
issues could be raised about any close question under the materiality standard. The very
difficulty of the issue explains why the matter is typically left for the jury. Moreover, it
was unclear what was "novel" about the claim. Facts surrounding the resignation of a
director have long been recognized as potentially important information. Item 6 of Form
8-K under the Exchange Act requires companies to disclose any time a director has
resigned as a result "of a disagreement with the registrant." Item 6, 17 C.F.R. 249.8-K.
Moreover, cases have held that conflict at the board level can be material. See
Cooperman v. Individual Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1999) (conflict at the board level
over the future direction of the company could be material). But see In re Frederick's of
Hollywood S'holders Litig., No. 15944 (con.), 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *27 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 31, 2000) (reasons for resignation of directors three months before approval of
merger not material).
149. No. 15339, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1998).
150. I(.at*11.
151. Id. at *6.
152. Id. at *14 ("A bright line rule demanding that all such facts be disclosed would




Plaintiff's artfully phrased siren song that he "didn't care how the
disclosure was characterized so long as the facts were there" does
not dissuade me from concluding it is no more than an artifice
designed to camouflage an attempt at compelling self-
flagellation.... Until a court has formally adjudicated the
underlying allegation of wrongdoing, [the] board had no duty to
disclose the Chairman's knowledge of mistakes in accounting
practices in a manner which would force a statement to counter any
inference its accounting practices could be characterized as
wrongful.5 '
The court seemed to suggest that facts creating an inference of
wrongdoing did not have to be disclosed.'54
The analysis inappropriately equated the disclosure of the
underlying facts with the obligation to characterize them in a
pejorative fashion. An acknowledgement that the chairman knew of
the accounting irregularities would not preclude the company from
including an explanation and a context.'9 Nor would such disclosure
automatically mean that the chairman had violated the law." 6
The prohibition on self-flagellation has, therefore, been used as
an excuse to avoid disclosure not only of legal conclusions and
pejorative characterizations but also of underlying facts. The doctrine
has been used to treat, as immaterial, facts concerning the bidding
process to purchase a company,57 the valuation methodology used in
a merger,'8 the failure to properly file reports required under the
securities laws,'59 and the negotiations between a parent and an
153. Id. at *15.
154. Delaware courts have occasionally expressed discomfort with the doctrine. See
Brown v. Perrette, No. 13531,1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *22 (Del. Ch. May 14,1999) ("I
find it troublesome that a board can escape disclosure of material information precisely
because the materiality arises from the board's alleged misdeeds." (emphasis in original)).
155. In fact, the chairman acknowledged his awareness of the treatment but "believed
that they were either done legitimately or did not affect the company's financial picture."
Wolf, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *11.
156. The Commission takes the position that the failure to adhere to GAAP creates a
presumption that the financial statements were misleading. See In the Matter of Advanced
Medical Products, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37649 (admin. proc. September 5,
1996) ("Failure to present financial statements in conformity with GAAP results in a
presumption that the statements are misleading and inaccurate."). Courts, on the other
hand, tend to look at each instance of nonconformity, without creating any presumption.
The issue tends to arise not under the rubric of materiality, but whether the false
disclosure met the requirements for scienter. See BROWN, supra note 7, § 1.04[2].
157. Brown, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *34 n.25.
158. Citron v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 503 (Del. Ch. 1990).
159. In Brody v. Zaucha, 697 A.2d 749 (Del. 1997), plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
had failed to disclose various violations of the securities laws, including the failure to file a
complete Schedule 13D and a Form 4. The court rightfully concluded that the defendant
did not have "to make self-accusatory statements." Id. at 754. On the other hand, a
defendant trying to obscure the purchase of additional shares might, as part of that
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independent board committee appointed by the target company.60
Other facts not subject to disclosure under the self-flagellation
doctrine include a decision to promote a merger in part to allow a
controlling shareholder to avoid estate taxes 61 and the failure to
disclose shareholder opposition to a stock buy-back program. 6 2
The extension of this doctrine to surrounding facts has conflicted
with general notions of full disclosure, something recognized by the
Delaware courts. One decision expressly acknowledged the conflict,
at least in the case of affirmative misrepresentations6. Nonetheless,
on the whole, the courts have declined to impose any meaningful
requirement that fiduciaries reveal facts suggesting a lack of integrity
or conflict of interest.
(2) Federal Regime
Courts under the federal regime take a different approach. They
agree with the ban on pejorative characterizations and admissions of
legal wrongdoing.'65 Nonetheless, they have routinely found as
process, fail to file applicable disclosure documents. In these circumstances, the failure to
file a Form 4 as an underlying fact may be material.
160. Citron, 584 A.2d at 503; see also Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp., No. 5915, 1983
Del. Ch. LEXIS 443, at **28-29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983).
161. Weingarden & Stark v. Meenan Oil Co., Nos. 7291 & 87310 (con.), 1985 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 374, at **6-7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 1985).
162. Seibert v. Harper & Row, Publrs., No. 6639, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 523, at *16 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 5, 1984).
163. See Brown v. Perrette, No. 13531, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *25 n.19 (Del. Ch.
May 14, 1999) (noting that the "rule against self-flagellation might be waived if the
corporation affirmatively declared that no violation occurred"); see also Siegman v.
Columbia Pictures Entm't, Inc., No 11152, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jan.
15, 1993) (Once having spoken, defendants "had an obligation to speak truthfully.").
164. The court seemed to make the proper distinction in Wells Fargo & Co. v. First
Interstate Bancorp, No. 14696, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at **28-31 (Del Ch. Jan. 18, 1996).
Plaintiffs alleged that the bidder began repurchasing larger quantities of its own shares in
an effort to boost stock prices following the announcement of a merger. Id. at *4. The
court agreed that the purchases could be material and subject to disclosure but that the
motivation for them was not. Id. at *15. Similarly, in Siegman the court agreed that the
company had no affirmative obligation to disclose the possibility that the transaction
violated a particular statute. Siegman, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at **21-22. Nonetheless,
once the company represented that the statute "was not implicated in the transaction," it
had an obligation to explain completely the relevance of the provision. Id. at *22.
165. One court specifically noted that characterizations add nothing to the total mix
and are not, therefore, material, as a matter of law. See Kowal v. MCI Communications
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994):
We agree with the district court that many of plaintiffs' allegations called for
pejorative characterizations of disclosed factual matters. Since the use of a
particular pejorative adjective will not alter the total mix of information available
to the investing public, such statements are immaterial as a matter of law and
cannot serve as the basis of a lob-5 action under any theory.
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material factual information surrounding the activity. 66 Essentially,
the approach by the federal courts has been to require full disclosure
but to leave the characterization to shareholders.
Facts suggesting a conflict of interest or improper motivation
have routinely been found material.'67 The information would allow
shareholders "to give more careful scrutiny" to the transaction.6' As
one court noted,
[T]he violation arising from the failure to disclose such a potential
conflict of interest does not turn on the failure to disclose a
director's true motivations but rather stems from the failure to
disclose a fact that puts the shareholder on notice of a potential
impairment of the director's judgment. Whether or not the
director's underlying action could give rise to liability for breach of
fiduciary duty under state law is not relevant. The information by
itself is material for the shareholder to place the director's
recommendation in perspective.'
The line between underlying facts and characterizations is not
always clear. In some cases, the underlying facts lead to an
ineluctable conclusion about the inappropriateness of the behavior,
(citations omitted). See also Recupito v. Prudential Sec., 112 F. Supp. 449, 457 (D. Md.
2000):
Additionally, CMI's failure to describe the subordinated CMBS as "extremely
illiquid" does not render the prospectus misleading. The prospectus clearly
explains that there was a limited secondary trading market for the subordinated
CMBS and warned of the potential consequences of this "illiquidity." A
prospectus 'need not characterize a security or a risk in pejorative manner.'
Whether CMI used the adjective Plaintiff chooses is not the focus of the court's
inquiry.
(citation omitted).
166. See, e.g., Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 876 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1016 (1989). See also Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
1989) ("Although the federal securities laws do not require a person to publicly confess to
engaging in illegitimate or illegal conduct, the securities laws do require disclosure of
material facts relating to a person's action."); In re Metlife Demutualization Litig., 156
F. Supp. 2d 254, 268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Although the Securities Act did not require
MetLife Co. to verbalize all negative inferences, it cannot be said as a matter of law that a
reasonable policyholder would have been able to make the appropriate inference about
the costs of elections from the facts disclosed."). For a series of cases finding adequate
disclosure of the underlying facts, see Kas v. Financial General Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d
508 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir.
1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); and Valley National Bank v. Trustee for Westgate-
California Corp., 609 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
167. As one court noted, "[F]acts of this nature have always been considered material."
Kas, 796 F.2d at 513.
168. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
169. Kas, 796 F.2d at 513. Thus, in RMED International, Inc. v. Sloan's Supermarket,
Inc., the court held that the omission of an investigation by the FTC would be material.
185 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The investigation indicated that the company's
acquisition of supermarkets in New York could potentially violate the antitrust laws. Id.
at 395-97.
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all but indistinguishable from the characterization itself. Nonetheless,
the inevitability of the characterization does not constitute a
justification for nondisclosure.
An example of the required disclosure of underlying facts under
the federal securities laws occurred in Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.
Securities Litigation. ,"" There, plaintiff alleged that the company failed
to disclose a scheme to bribe FDA employees to secure expedited
approval of various drugs and to slow approval of competing
products.' Public disclosure documents revealed the number of
drugs receiving approval and indicated that the company "led the
industry in obtaining approvals."'7  In fact, Par had apparently
obtained the quick approvals not from business acumen but from
illegal payments.'73
The affirmative nature of the statements made the outcome
straight-forward. Although acknowledging the general rule that
companies had no obligation to disclose "uncharged criminal
behavior, or to accuse itself of antisocial or illegal policies," the court
held that the approach did not eliminate the duty to make accurate
and complete disclosure.' Having discussed the approval process,
completeness dictated the disclosure of the payments:
A reasonable jury could find that, by extolling Par's ability to
obtain FDA approvals, by comparing Par's success in this regard to
other companies in the industry and to its own previous
performance, and by projecting continued success in obtaining
rapid approvals, the statements conveyed to a reasonable investor
the false impression that Par had a particular expertise in obtaining
FDA approvals constituting a legitimate competitive advantage
over other companies and that this advantageous expertise was
responsible for its success in obtaining FDA approvals.
7
Thus, defendants had a duty to disclose the payments, even
though such disclosure effectively amounted to an admission of
improper activity.
7 6
In other cases, courts have characterized omitted information as
material because it suggested a motivation other than the best
interests of shareholders. In Mendell v. Greenberg, a large
170. 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
171. Id. at 672-73.
172. Id. at 676.
173. Id. at 675.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 677-78.
176. See also In re Sotheby's Holdings Sec. Litig., 00 Civ. 1041 (DLC), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12504 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000) (duty to disclose price fixing scheme where
company stated that it was engaging in "intense competition" with its primary
competitor).
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shareholder died, creating a heavy estate tax burden. 77  Shortly
afterwards, the company entered into a merger agreement. 7  The
proxy statement said nothing about the tax obligations, information
that may have suggested a possible motivation for the transaction. 
'79
The court conceded that the motivation for the merger did not have
to be disclosed, only "objective material facts relating to the
transaction."'" Nonetheless, the substantial estate tax liability
represented a fact that was "not so inconsequential as to allow
summary judgment.""'
Federal courts have consistently required that companies
disclose facts indicating a conflict of interest or illegal activity.' This
includes the need to reveal personal indebtedness' and that a merger
was motivated by a desire to eliminate two derivative suits."' The
177. 927 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1991).
178. Id.
179. Id. Tax motivations were also an issue in Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d
Cir. 1979). In that case, the directors approved a plan to allow senior officers to accelerate
the exercise date of certain stock options. Id. at 792. According to plaintiffs, acceleration
provided the officers with, and deprived the company of, certain tax benefits. Id. In
agreeing that the omission of the tax consequences was actionable, the court noted that
the matter raised concern about the integrity of management:
Since self-dealing presents opportunities for abuse of a corporate position of
trust, the circumstances surrounding corporate transactions in which directors
have a personal interest are directly relevant to determination of whether they
are qualified to exercise stewardship of the company .... [I]t has been
recognized that shareholders are entitled to truthful presentation of factual
information "impugning the honest, loyalty or competency of directors" in their
dealings with the corporation to which they owe a fiduciary duty.
Id. at 796 (citation omitted).
180. Mendell, 927 F.2d at 674.
181. Id. at 674. This case can be contrasted with Weingarden & Stark v. Meenan Oil
Co., Nos. 7291 & 87310 (con.), 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 374 (Del Ch. Jan. 2, 1985), where the
court held that the omission of a possible tax motive for the transaction was not material:
The first alleged omission is the failure to disclose that a purported purpose of
the merger was to enable Kenny, Jr. to transfer his Meenan stockholdings to
Kenny, III free of estate taxes.... However, even if plaintiffs were asserting this
alleged improper purpose as a disclosure claim, it fails as a matter of law.
Corporate officials are not required to engage in "self-flagellation" or speculate
as to alleged improper motives.
Id. at **6-7.
182. See Kas v. Financial General Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[C]ase law recognize[s] a cause of action based on a failure to disclose that a member of
management has a personal stake in a corporate decision or has some special relationship
to another party to a bargain for which shareholder approval is sought.").
183. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1086 (2d Cir. 1977).
184. See Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 376, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("The Proxy is replete with the Board's purported justifications for the merger. Having
thus undertaken to describe the motivation for structuring the transaction as they did, the
Board was obligated to state all the important purposes of the merger, including that of
extinguishing the ... derivative suits.").
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requirement applies even where the fiduciary obtains no economic
benefit as a result of the relevant transaction."" With the underlying
facts, shareholders make their own determination. They decide
whether the facts call into question the fairness of the transaction.
D. Valuations
(1) General
Another heavily litigated disclosure area concerns valuation-
related data. For shareholders asked to vote on a merger or to tender
their shares, few issues matter more than the expected consideration.
In making an informed decision, shareholders would seemingly desire
facts suggesting the possibility of a higher price. The information may
result in non-approval or a decision to vote against the matter to
preserve the right to challenge the fairness of the transaction.16
Agreement exists among both Delaware and federal courts that
materiality does not extend to speculative or highly unreliable data.'
This would exempt valuations determined in a cursory or unreliable
fashion or offers that lacked sufficient indicia of seriousness.
Assuming an adequate degree of reliability, however, federal, but not
state, courts, find as material information suggesting a higher value
than the one presented to shareholders for approval. Delaware
courts, in contrast, have been adamant, even hostile, toward
shareholder allegations that information and data on alternate
valuations should be requiredi9
185. See Kas, 796 F.2d at 513.
186. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2002). Shareholders voting for a transaction
forfeit their right to challenge its fairness. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d
840, 848 (Del. 1975) ("However, when an informed minority shareholder either votes in
favor of the merger, or like Bershad, accepts the benefits of the transaction, he or she
cannot thereafter attack its fairness.").
187. See Arnold v. Sec'y for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994) ("Delaware
law does not require disclosure of inherently unreliable or speculative information ....");
see also Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17272, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Aug. t5, 2000).
188. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, No. 16493, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 227, at *16 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 1, 1999) ("Delaware law does not, however, require disclosure of unreliable or
speculative information that would confuse shareholders or inundate them with an
overload of information."); see also Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., No. 7046, 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 27, at *49 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) ("To be the subject of a disclosure
obligation, information relating to value must be considered reliable .... Neither set of
figures was intended to serve as a valuation of the company [and the projections] were not
sufficiently reliable evidence of value to be the subject of mandated disclosure to
stockholders."); Goodwin v. Live Entm't, No. 15,765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at **35-38
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 1999) (failure to disclose that target was "receiving a premium for its
Series C stock over a hypothetical concluded market value" held not actionable where
material to be disclosed was "inherently tentative" and "would not have contributed
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More remarkable, state courts have used the very importance of
the information to justify a finding of immateriality. Thus, in In re
Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litigation,"' the court
refused to find material a range of possible values presented to the
board and used in the deliberation process. In so doing, the court
decided that the information would cause "enormous harm" by
misleading investors into thinking that a higher price was possible."
(2) State Law Regime
The materiality of valuations often comes up in transactions that
involve fairness opinions. These opinions attest to the adequacy of
the offering price. They are used to fulfill the board's fiduciary
obligation to make an informed decision.9 ' Nothing in the fairness
opinion process provides information that places the valuation in
perspective. Typically stating that an offer is fair "from a financial
point of view," the opinion generally speaks only to the fairness of the
offer at issue and does not address alternative valuations or consider
the likelihood of a higher offer.'92
The opinion also does not usually disclose the range of possible
fair prices or analyze fairness in non-financial terms.' 3 Management
may in fact have received other offers or have used other formulas
that suggest a greater value. Presumably such information would be
meaningfully or reliably to the shareholders' consideration of whether the price they were
receiving for their common stock was fair .... Further disclosure therefore may have
made the Proxy Statement less, not more, reliable.").
189. No. 12085 (con.), 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 195, *40 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991).
190. Id. at *41 ("Disclosure of this analysis would have presented an enormous
potential for harm to the shareholders. Even if the disclosure included a sentence why
Kidder believed the analysis produced an inflated range, it could have mislead
shareholders into believing that a higher price was attainable."). This was true if the range
had been accompanied by an explanation about changes in market conditions that made
the range suspect. See also Goodwin, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *45 (disclosure of asset
valuations based on different assumptions would have been "confusing" to shareholders).
191. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,873 (Del. 1985).
192. See O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, 745 A.2d 902, 929 (Del. Ch. 1999):
[T]he duty of disclosure does not appear to require them, when they have
received only one offer, to disclose information from which the stockholders
could assess whether the offer represents the highest value reasonably available
to the company's stockholders, as opposed to whether the offer at issue
represents fair value.
193. For a discussion of fairness opinions, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan,
Symposium: Fundamental Corporate Changes: Causes, Effects, and Legal Responses:
Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J.
27 (1989).
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important to shareholders in deciding whether to approve the
transaction.'9
The issue of alternative values can arise in a number of different
circumstances. The first concerns the existence of other offers. The
second involves alternative valuations that vary depending upon the
type of transaction. The third concerns values that change with the
use of other formulas. Although sometimes relying on the
unreliability of the data, the courts in Delaware have excluded all
such information from the definition of materiality. They have done
so despite the talismanic importance of investment banking opinions
in the shareholder approval process.9 5
a. Alternative Offers
Perhaps nothing could be more important to shareholders
deciding whether to approve the sale of a business than information
on the availability of other, higher-priced offers. Delaware courts
have not, however, required disclosure of such information. In
declining to do so, they have largely used an analysis and approach
194. Although Delaware courts on the whole have excluded the information from the
definition of materiality, the first modern case in the area took exactly the opposite view.
See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977):
Technically speaking, the language may be accurate; but that kind of generality is
hardly a substitute for hard facts when the law requires complete candor. And
when, as here, management was in possession of two estimates from responsible
sources-one using a "floor" approach defining value in terms of its lowest
worth, and the other a more "optimistic" or ceiling approach defining value in
terms of its highest worth-it is our opinion that complete candor required
disclosure of both estimates. If management believed that one estimate was
more accurate or realistic than another, it was free to endorse that estimate and
to explain the reason for doing so; but full disclosure, in our view, was a
prerequisite.
195. In considering the blanket conclusion that the information supporting the opinion
of investment bankers need not be disclosed to shareholders, one lower court
characterized the approach as "intellectually unsatisfying."
Fearing stepping on the SEC's toes and worried about encouraging prolix
disclosures, the Delaware courts have been reluctant to require informative,
succinct disclosure of investment banker analyses in circumstances in which the
bankers' views about value have been cited as justifying the recommendation of
the board. But this reluctance has been accompanied by more than occasional
acknowledgement of the utility of such information, acknowledgement that is
understandable given the substantial encouragement Delaware case law has
given to the deployment of investment bankers by boards of directors addressing
mergers and tender offers.
In my view, it is time that this ambivalence be resolved in favor of a firm
statement that stockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the substantive
work performed by the investment bankers upon whose advice the
recommendations of their board as to how to vote on a merger or tender rely.
In re Pure Res., Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421,449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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for determining materiality expressly rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court.'96
Rather than weigh probability against magnitude, the test
employed at the federal level, Delaware courts have categorically
concluded that other offers are not material.'97 They treat them as an
invitation to negotiate and have determined that negotiations are
immaterial as a matter of law absent agreement on price and post-
merger structure. As a result, offers are little more than mere
inquiries and "indications of interest from other potential buyers, and
the handling of these inquiries need not be disclosed as they concern





Wisconsin Investment Board v. Bartlett'99 represents an example
of the approach used in Delaware. The board of Medco Research
authorized the chairman to negotiate a merger.2"' In the event
negotiations were successful, the chairman was to receive 0.75% of
the aggregate value of any consideration paid in the transaction.""
The chairman, therefore, had a financial incentive to ensure
completion of a merger, even at an inadequate price. Ultimately, the
company accepted a merger proposal from King Pharmaceuticals and
submitted the matter to shareholders for approval.2"2  Plaintiffs
alleged that the proxy material omitted information on other offers."3
The opinion admitted that there was "substantial disagreement"
between the parties over "the efforts taken" by the company's board
"to engage in discussions with other potential suitors. Moreover,
the court acknowledged that "not every potential suitor either
became the subject of intense scrutiny or implicated mutual due
196. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-39 (1988).
197. See McMullin v. Beran, No. 16493, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 227, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec.
1, 1999) ("Moreover, preliminary discussions held in order to arrange mergers are
immaterial."). See also Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 847 (Del. 1975)
("We also find that the defendants were under no duty to disclose the substance of their
discussions with Indian Head or any other casual inquiries they received about Dorr-
Oliver. Efforts by public corporations to arrange mergers are immaterial under the
Rosenblatt v. Getty standard, as a matter of law, until the firms have agreed on the price
and structure of the transaction."); Krim v. Pronet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 528-29 (Del. Ch.
1999) ("Plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations about other 'discussions or
negotiations,' and fails to plead any specific facts regarding potential suitors besides
MetroCall. Moreover, even if such 'discussions or negotiations' did exist, they need not be
disclosed." (citations omitted)).
198. McMullin, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 227, at *17 (internal punctuation omitted).
199. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,2000).
200. Id. at **3-4.
201. Id. at "4n.1.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id. at **15-16.
204. Id. at *15.
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diligence, ' '... suggesting that in fact some had reached such a stage.
Nonetheless, the court refused to find the other offers material,
characterizing them as little more than "indications of interest;" offers
that were "preliminary in order to explore the possibility of a business
combination that might lead to a merger agreement, and little
more."206
Abject characterizations of other offers as preliminary or as
expressions of interest amounts to conclusions, not analysis. First, the
court never explained why suitors given "intense scrutiny" or offers
that were subject to board discussion failed to meet the materiality
test. Second, labeling an offer as "preliminary" does not, perforce,
equate with immateriality. Offers require negotiation. The mere
receipt of a serious offer at an attractive price can constitute material
information even without additional negotiations.
b. Alternative Transactions
Delaware courts oppose the disclosure of values arising out of
alternative transactions, routinely finding the information
immaterial."7 Courts sometimes characterize the data as uncertain
and speculative, despite strong indications of reliability."' Other
times they disavow the need for shareholders to consider anything
except the precise transaction placed before them. Finally, they often
emphasize the possibility of investor confusion arising from multiple
valuations."9
Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.2"" involved an
example of multiple valuations. Bancorp suffered severe financial
205. Id. at *16.
206. In another case, the court specifically found immaterial a statement that the
company had received interest from other bidders "at a more attractive price" despite the
fact that price had not been discussed at all. In Golden Cycle v. Allan the court
rationalized that, given the ongoing hostile tender offer, shareholders could infer that
those "who had expressed some interest" in fact "understood that a price in excess" of
that offered by the bidder was necessary. No. 16301, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80 at *25.(Del.
Ch. May 20, 1998).
207. See Frank v. Arnelle, No. 15642, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 176, at *22 (Del. Ch. Sept.
16, 1998) ("Delaware courts do not require mandatory disclosure of valuation opinions
prepared in connection with a board's approval of a self-tender offer.").
208. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1289 (Del. 1989) ("Even the best
estimate constitutes an exercise in enlightened speculation that may or may not be borne
out by subsequent developments."); see also Van de Walle v. Unimation, [1991] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 95,834 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) ("[T]o be the subject of a disclosure
obligation, information relating to value must be considered reliable.").
209. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1289 ("We see no reason why candor would demand that
shareholders be deluged with conflicting estimates of financial performance, many of
which have been made stale by the passage of time.").
210. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
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difficulties. 1 One of its subsidiaries, Fidelity Acceptance, however,
remained profitable.212 Eventually, Bancorp retained Goldman Sachs
to shop the company.2 When no acquirors were forthcoming,
Goldman proposed breaking up the company and solicited offers for
each part, including Fidelity Acceptance.2 "4  Goldman eventually
proposed to the board the sale of each separate piece of Bancorp,
with all remaining assets placed in a "stub" bank.215 Based on this
approach, Goldman estimated the value of each share of Bancorp at
$19.26, although the value of the stub bank was considered highly• • 216
uncertain. The executive summary presented to the board disclosed
that the stub required some cash, with the amount "subject to
negotiations with various buyers. ' 217 Further, the summary noted that
"material deterioration" in the loan portfolio or the failure of the
portfolio to meet "secondary market documentation" could have a
negative affect on valuation.2
By an eight-to-five vote, the board declined to approve the
transaction. 29 Eventually, the board agreed to a merger with the
Bank of Boston for $17.30 per share.2 ' The proxy statement
discussed the proposal by Goldman but stated that "the board was
advised that, in light of uncertainties involving the value of certain
assets, the value ultimately distributable to shareholders could only
be estimated., 2' Plaintiffs challenged the failure to disclose the
break-up value presented to the board.222
In finding the information immaterial, the court noted that the
board had to balance the benefits of disclosure against the harms.223
The harm came from the concern that shareholders might think a
higher offer was possible. "Disclosing an overly optimistic per share
figure may be harmful because it might induce stockholders to hold
out for an elusive, higher bid., 224 The opinion, however, gave a
second reason for finding the information immaterial. Relying on





216. Id. at 1274-75.
217. Id. at 1283.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1275.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1278.
222. Id. at 1276.
223. Id. at 1282.
224. Id. at 1282-83.
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conclusory affidavits produced by the defendants,225 the court held
that the $19.26 valuation was too speculative and unreliable and that
disclosure could "under some circumstances, constitute material
misrepresentation., 22' Thus, the court suggested that the company
could commit fraud by disclosing the alternative valuation.
Several things make the analysis in the opinion suspect. First,
the characterization that the estimates were unreliable lacked any
sound basis. They were not back-of-the-envelope calculations that
lacked credibility. Instead, they were used in a formal presentation to
the board by a reputable investment banking firm. They amounted to
reasoned prognostication. Moreover, the estimates were certain
enough for presentation for board review and reliable enough to
ensure that the board met its obligation to be informed under the
business judgment rule.
Second, whatever uncertainty existed, the court nowhere
explained how these concerns rendered the disclosure adequate for
the board but inadequate for shareholders.27 The value of the stub
bank may have been speculative but it was based upon the book
value. The risk that the trading value could differ was commonplace
and easy to explain in the proxy materials.
Finally, the opinion contained inherent contradictions. With the
definition of materiality focusing on matters important to a
reasonable shareholder, the court all but conceded that shareholders
would rely on the information about the break-up value of the
company. Indeed, the information might cause shareholders to
oppose the transaction and hold out for an "elusive, higher bid."22
225. Although the court placed considerable weight on the affidavits, they seemed
conclusory and unpersuasive. They did little more than note that the use of book value
and the possibility that the market would provide an alternative, lower value to the shares
of the stub bank. As one affidavit noted: "Goldman made it clear to Board [sic] that the
value was based on the book value of the stub assets, which is not reflective of the amount
of their market or liquidation value." Id. at 1283. Another stated that "[w]e told the
Board that the $3.32 per share value we attributed to the stub was simply its estimated
book value and that stock in the stub was likely to trade for considerably less." Id. Others
described the stub value as "speculative." Id. at 1279-80. The statements, therefore, did
little more than disclose the obvious fact that it would be inherently difficulty to predict
market value in the aftermath of a break up of the company and the formation of a stub
bank.
226. Id. at 1283.
227. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) ("If
management believed that one estimate was more accurate or realistic than another, it was
free to endorse that estimate and to explain the reason for doing so; but full disclosure, in
our view, was the prerequisite.").
228. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1283. It is not entirely clear what the court meant by elusive.
To the extent that it suggested the impossibility of the alternative, this was hard to
understand. The alternative transaction-a break up of the company-was entirely within
the power of the board to implement.
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The opinion nowhere explained why this was inappropriate or why
this was the only use for the information.
Perhaps the most extraordinary example of an unwillingness to
require the disclosure of alternative transactions occurred in Skeen v.
Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.22 In that case, House of Fabrics engaged in a
second step merger to acquire the remaining 23% of the shares of
Fabri-Centers.230 With 77% of the votes, House of Fabrics had the
power to approve the transaction.231 Minority shareholders, therefore,
had little role in the transaction.232  Plaintiffs alleged that the
Information Statement circulated by House of Fabrics omitted
material information.233 Among other things, they contended that
they should have received a summary of methodologies and range of
values used by the investment banker in deriving the fairness
opinion.234 Particularly since the merger price was 20% below book
value, shareholders contended that the information would have given
them a better idea about the price they could have obtained had they
chosen to exercise their appraisal rights.'
In finding the information immaterial, the court did not focus on
reliability, nor did the court find an absence of a relationship between
the ranges of value and the possible appraisal price.21' The court
conceded that plaintiffs wanted the information to assist in valuing
the company. "  Nonetheless, the court categorically excluded the
information, characterizing the request as "a new disclosure
standard" involving "helpful" but not material information: "They
suggest that stockholders should be given all the financial data they
would need if they were making an independent determination of fair
value. Appellants offer no authority for their position and we see no
reason to depart from our traditional standards. 38
In fact, however, shareholders did not request all of the financial
information necessary to value the company. They simply asked for
the range of values used by the investment banker. Unless unreliable
or otherwise failing to meet the test for the materiality of speculative
229. 750 A.2d 1170 (Del. 2000).
230. Id. at 1171-72.
231. Id. at 1172.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1173.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1174.
236. Id. at 1173-74.
237. Id. at 1174.
238. Id at 1174. See also In re Staples, Inc. S'holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 954 (Del. Ch.
2001) ("duty did not require the directors to provide financial information that was merely
'helpful' or cumulative to other information that was provided, and the duty did not
extend to the provision of information to permit stockholders to make "an independent
determination of fair value").
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information, the valuation range would seem important to a
shareholder asked to give up dissenters rights, at least where the price
offered in the transaction was at the low end of the range.
Delaware courts have consistently refused to find this type of
information material. They have refused to acknowledge the
materiality of ranges in value developed by an investment banking
firm and presented to the board of directors,239 valuations prepared
by an investment banking firm in the context of a solvency opinion,24"
calculations of liquidation value,241' and valuations prepared for
accounting purposes.242 The courts have also been unwilling to
require disclosure of alternative transactions, even in cases of
affirmative misrepresentations. 24 Despite occasional attempts to base
239. See In re Vitalink Communications Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 12085 (con.), 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 195, **40-41 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991) (holding that omission of range of
fair values determined by investment banking firm not material).
240. See Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 702 A.2d 150, 157 (Del. 1997).
241. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1289 (Del. 1989).
242. See Klang, 702 A.2d at 157 (decision to render such information immaterial "was
premised upon the sentiment that figures generated for purely accounting purposes are
useless predictors of market value, and are at least as likely to mislead stockholders as to
enlighten them").
243. In Goodwin v. Live Entm't, No. 15765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at **8-11 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 22, 1999), Bain Capital agreed to acquire Live Entertainment in a merger. Common
shareholders were to receive a premium of approximately 50%. Id. at **8-9. Pioneer
Electronics owned 637,844 shares of common stock and all of the shares of the Series C
Preferred shares, with a total of 50.7% of the voting power. Id. at **5-6. The proxy
materials indicated that Pioneer favored the merger despite the fact that the Series C
Preferred shares would be purchased at a price "substantially less than the amount to
which Pioneer would be entitled upon a liquidation of the Company." Id. at *30. The
statement about Pioneer amounted to a representation that the price offered in the
merger was fair. See id. at *30. Pioneer's willingness to sell the preferred shares at below
liquidation value suggested that the price paid for the common was very attractive and
compensated for any shortfall on the preferred. The language also seemed to eliminate
any concern that Pioneer would accept a low price on the common stock (which had to be
given to all shareholders) in return for a higher price for the preferred shares (which only
Pioneer owned). See id. In fact, however, the preferred shares were not subject to
redemption at their liquidation value. Id. at *32. Pioneer had no right to receive a price
premised upon liquidation value. In assessing the market value of the preferred shares,
internal valuations indicated that the price paid for the Series C Preferred Shares would
involve a substantial premium over market value. See id. at *32. Thus, in direct
contradiction to the statement in the proxy materials, Pioneer received a premium for the
preferred shares, something that could have been compensation for an inadequate price
paid for the common shares. Nonetheless, the court found the internal valuations of the
preferred shares immaterial. See id. at **36-37. "The disclosure of a hypothetical-and
therefore inherently tentative-concluded market value of the Series C would not have
contributed meaningfully or reliably to the shareholders' consideration of whether the
price they were receiving for their common stock was fair." Id. The court also
emphasized that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of "improper motive." Id. at *40.
"In the absence of any evidence that Pioneer received anything at the expense of the
common stockholders, it is impossible to infer that Pioneer (or its affiliate directors), much
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decisions on the speculativeness of the data, the courts have objected
to this type of information rather than focusing its concern on
reliability.
c. Alternative Formulas
The formula used to calculate price or determine valuation has
also generated considerable litigation. Companies may use different
formulas or assumptions in calculating value. Courts routinely refuse
to require disclosure of the assumptions underlying,2" or the
projections used in determining,245 valuations .246 Nor have they
required disclosure of other information invariably suggesting that
the price to be paid could have been higher.247
less the other directors or [the investment banker], were motivated by a desire to conceal
material facts about the value of the Series C." Id. at **40-41. Finally, the court went so
far as to disavow the misleading nature of the disclosure, noting that the information was
"literally true." Id. at *38. In arriving at the remarkable conclusion, the court conflated
notions of materiality with state of mind requirements. The court indicated that
the bargaining history regarding Pioneer's Series C position is free from any hint
that Pioneer attempted to obtain unreasonable consideration for its Series C
position at the expense of the common stockholders.... In the absence of any
evidence that Pioneer received anything at the expense of the common
stockholders, it is impossible to infer that Pioneer (or its affiliate directors), much
less the other directors.., were motivated by a desire to conceal material facts
about the value of the Series C.
Id. at **40-41. Moreover, materiality focuses solely on the information important to a
reasonable investor. In this case, the fact that the largest shareholder in fact received a
substantial premium for a class of shares only it held, in contrast to affirmative statements
in the proxy indicating that the shareholder received less that the value of the shares,
would seemingly be important to a reasonable investor. Rather than provide the
information to shareholders and allow them to draw their own conclusion, the court
decided to do it for them.
244. See Goodwin, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *33 (no obligation to disclose "underlying
analysis supporting a fairness opinion"). But see In re Staples, Inc. S'holders Litig., 792
A.2d 934, 958 (Del. Ch. 2001) (suggesting that companies may sometimes have obligation
to reveal projections provided by the company and used in determining fairness: "One
suspects that the projections are the information that most stockholders would find the
most useful to them.").
245. See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., No. 16963, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at **20-21
(Del. Ch. May 3, 1999) (no obligation to disclose projections used in determining fairness
opinion by investment banker).
246. See Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, No. 13618, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80, at *17 (Del.
Ch. July 5, 1995) ("The plaintiffs have cited no authority that requires a corporation to
disclose to its shareholders all of the information that it furnished to its valuation advisors
in connection with the transaction.").
247. In Weiss v. Samsonite Corp., the company made a self tender offer for 51% of its
shares. 741 A.2d 366, 374-76 (Del. Ch. 1999). The $40 price represented a 33% premium
over market and would largely be financed through additional borrowing. Id. at 369. The
proxy materials disclosed the price, the potential depressing effect on the post-tender
market for the company's shares, and the need for all stockholders to tender to ensure
success of the plan. Id. at 370. More than 97% of all shares were tendered. Id. In the
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In In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
an acquiror offered $10.50 per share, a 23% premium over market.240
The target's investment banking firm had conducted a financial
analysis of the value of the company using a number of different
formulas.24 Each resulted in a range of values greater than the
offering price.50
In declining to find material the range of values based on the
discounted cash flow analysis, the court did not focus on reliability.
Instead, the court conducted a balancing test, weighing costs against
benefits. 25' "[I]ts potential benefit was, at best, minimal: to act as a
mere affirmance to the shareholders of the Board's message that this
was a very good deal., 252 At the same time, the harm was deemed
considerable.25  "Even if the disclosure included a sentence
explaining why the analysis was overly optimistic, it could have misled
shareholders into believing that a higher price was attainable.,
254
With respect to the investment banking firm's comparable
transaction analysis, the range was "unreliable" and based upon
aftermath, however, prices of Samsonite fell by more than expected, with the result that
shareholders lost $2-$3 in value compared with the pre-tender offer price. Id. at 375.
Plaintiffs sued, alleging, among other things, that the company failed to disclose the
methodology and "reasoning" behind the $40 price offered in the tender offer and its
calculation of "total value." Id. at 374. The court disagreed. Shareholders had enough
information to determine whether to tender, sell into the market, or hold the shares.
"How the $40 number was arrived at in this circumstance, where the shareholders would
retain their relative equity interest, would make no more difference than it would had the
Board simply declared a $40 extraordinary dividend." Id. at 375. The court's decision was
true enough. Even had shareholders known about the methodology, they still had
considerable incentive to tender. That arose not from the merits of the proposal but the
coercive nature of the offer. Given the reality that post-tender offer share prices would be
lower, all shareholders had an incentive to tender and take advantage of the attractive
price on the front end. Nonetheless, it seems simplistic to suggest that a board could
simply announce an offer above the current market price without discussing how the
method used to determine the price. See also Frank v. Arnelle, No. 15642, 1998 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 176, at **16-17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1998) (no duty to disclose how price range in
Dutch auction tender offer determined). This is particularly true where the company
suspects that the transaction might have a negative impact on the post-market price.
248. No. 12085 (con.), 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 195, at **8-9 (Nov. 8, 1991).
249. Id. at **23-30.
250. Id.
251. Id. at **12-13.
252. Id. at *40.
253. Id.
254. As one court explained:
That is, because the Board did not know the extent of the overstatement and,
therefore, could not have disclosed the extent of the overstatement, the
shareholders could have read the disclosure and reasonably believed that even if
$11.75 was not attainable, a price higher than $10.50 was reasonably attainable
when all of the circumstances indicated that this was not the case.
Id. at **40-41.
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"market conditions that have changed drastically."' Disclosure
would have harmed investors by having them believe "a price higher
than $10.50 per share was reasonably attainable when all of the
circumstances indicated that this was not the case. 256 Finally, the
range of valuations based upon comparable companies was also
deemed immaterial. "[I]t is necessary to draw a line somewhere or
else disclosures will become so voluminous that they no longer serve
their purpose." '257
The court's analysis all but admitted the importance of the
information. Indeed, disclosure did not have to occur because of
concern over excessive reliance by shareholders. In truth, the
possibility of excessive reliance could have been tempered through
cautionary language rather than non-disclosure. Finally, the
importance of the information did not relate only to the availability of
a higher offer, something deemed by the court to be ephemeral at
best. Shareholders were asked to approve the sale at a given price.
Assent could deny them the opportunity to contest the price under a
state appraisal action."'
(3) Federal Regime
Valuation information at the federal level generally comes up in
two circumstances. In the context of a merger proxy statement or
tender offer documents, information suggesting a higher offer will
constitute material information. Courts have characterized offers
suggesting a higher price as inherently material. As one court noted,
"[F]irm offers from other potential purchasers, if they are more
favorable than the offer being endorsed by management, must be
disclosed in proxy materials soliciting shareholder approval ... ""'
The issue also comes up in the context of affirmative
misrepresentations. Management often represents the price as fair,
typically pointing to the opinion of an investment banker. Other
methods of valuing the company or the existence of competing offers
casts doubt on this conclusion. Non-disclosure of information about
other offers can suggest that the company affirmatively
255. Id. at *41.
256. Id. at **41-42.
257. Id. at *43. See also In re Dataproducts Corp. S'holders Litig., [1991] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep.(CCH) $ 96,227 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1991) ("Our law rejects the proposition that
disclosure of the detailed facts and specific analyses underlying a financial advisor's
valuation methodology is automatically mandated in all circumstances.").
258. See supra note 186.
259. South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1273
(9th Cir. 1982).
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misrepresented the fairness of the price." This does not mean that all
offers or alternative valuations automatically cross the threshold of
materiality. With respect to alternative valuations, they must meet
standards of reliability. With respect to other offers, they must reach
a stage of probability that makes them something more than mere
inquiries.6 Nonetheless, assuming these tests have been met, federal
courts generally presume that the information would be important to
a reasonable shareholder in deciding how to vote on a merger or
other sale of the business.
An example of the typical treatment of alternative valuations
occurred in Virginia Bankshares.62 In that case, the parent company
engaged in a merger with Virginia Bankshares in an effort to
eliminate the remaining 15% of the stock held by the public. The
board received a fairness opinion describing the $42 offering price as
fair6 2' The proxy materials also characterized the offer as fair and the
price as high . 2 " The Supreme Court agreed that such terms could be
actionable: "[S]uch conclusory terms in a commercial context are
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as
accurate, the absence of which renders them misleading."
266
The Court went on to point out that a basis in the record existed
for concluding that, in fact, the statements in this case were
misleading:
Whereas the proxy statement described the $42 price as offering a
premium above both book value and market price, the evidence
indicated that a calculation of the book figure based on the
appreciated value of the Bank's real estate holdings eliminated any
such premium. The evidence on the significance of market price
showed that [the investment bank] had conceded that the market
was closed, thin, and dominated by [the parent], facts omitted from
the statement. There was, indeed, evidence of a "going concern"
value for the Bank in excess of $60 per share of common stock,
another fact never disclosed. However conclusory the directors'
statement may have been, then, it was open to attack by garden-
variety evidence....
Thus, internal evidence in the company that challenged the $42 price
as fair was "garden-variety" evidence. This was true even though the
260. Little doubt exists about the ability to challenged these types of statements in the
aftermath of Virginia Bankshares. See generally Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083 (1991).
261. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-39 (1988).
262. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1083.
263. Id. at 1088.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1093.
267. Id. at 1094.
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board had obtained an opinion attesting to the fairness of the actual
price offered." 8
With respect to alternative offers, the courts are even clearer.
Admittedly, mere expressions of interest will not constitute material
information.6 9 Nonetheless, more substantial indications of interest
will often be important to a reasonable investor voting on the sale of
the business."' As one court noted: "management, when endorsing
one offer, must inform stockholders of any better one."27'
268. The approach also applies to other kinds of affirmative statements that go to the
value of the company. See In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993).
Failure to disclose alternative methods of raising capital contemplated by the company
was material and
Time Warner's public statements could have been understood by reasonable
investors to mean that the company hoped to solve the entire debt problem
through strategic alliances. Having publicly hyped strategic alliances, Time
Warner may have come under a duty to disclose facts that would place the
statements concerning strategic alliances in a materially different light.
Id. at 268 (emphasis in original).
269. See South Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265,
1273 (9th Cir. 1982) ("There is no duty to disclose inquiries or indications of interest that
do not fall within the category of firm or definite offers."). See also Giardina v. Fertel,
Inc., No. 00-1674 § "N," 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13681, **16-17 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2001)
(two phone calls between officers concerning possibility of merger constituted mere
overtures and were not material).
270. Flake v. Hoskins, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Kan. 1999), illustrates the usual approach
in this area. In that case, plaintiffs alleged that the proxy materials contained material
omissions by failing to disclose other offers. Id. at 1221-22. In addition, they contended
that the characterization of the merger as in the best interests of shareholders was
misleading because the board had better alternatives, including a convertible stock
offering. Id. at 1222. Defendants contested the materiality of the other offers, asserting
that they were not "firm." Id. In applying the probability-magnitude test in Basic, Inc.,
the court first noted that an offer could be material even if not firm. "Instead, in
determining whether information is so material as to require disclosure, the Court must
evaluate the extent of negotiations and effect of the potential transaction." Id. at 1222.
The existence of material offers cast doubt on the board's belief that the offer was in the
best interest in shareholders. The court concluded that the other offers were "more than
casual expressions of interest" and in fact included a price higher than the one offered in
the merger. Id. at 1223. As a result, they constituted potential antifraud violations. One
court even concluded that the nondisclosure of a withdrawn offer could be a material
omission. In Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D.
Pa. 1987), Meridian Bancorp made an offer to acquire Commonwealth. Id. at 241-42.
Ultimately, however, the offer was withdrawn. Id. at 244. Shortly afterwards,
Commonwealth agreed to a merger with another bank but omitted any mention of the
Meridian offer in the proxy statement. Id. at 247. The court agreed that the withdrawn
offer could be material. Id. at 253. "[T]he fact finder must decide whether, under all the
circumstances, Meridian's position as outlined was a sufficiently firm proposal reasonably
available to Commonwealth so that disclosure of its existence to the shareholders was
required." Id.
271. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,1295 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Unlike Delaware courts, cases under federal law do not speak
categorically about the materiality of alternative valuations. Nor do
they attempt to balance the "harm" of disclosure against the benefit.
Instead, they focus on the inherent importance of the information and
its reliability or probability.
Conclusion
Corporate law today imposes few absolute restrictions on
managerial behavior. With management wielding broad decision-
making authority, fiduciary obligations remain the only significant
limitation on board discretion. In the case of the duty of care, the
business judgment rule prevents substantive review of decisions.
Only if a decision amounts to waste will the courts intervene.
The logic of this approach arises from the belief that, in the
absence of a conflict of interest, management deserves great
deference and latitude in decision-making. Under the approach,
informed risk taking will not result in liability. The absolution rests
on a single pillar: that management had no alternative motivation for
making the decision and, although ultimately a bad decision, was
motivated by true desire to benefit shareholders.
The duty of loyalty, in contrast, arises in the context of self-
dealing. These transactions, therefore, raise the possibility that
directors are motivated by self-interest rather than the best interests
of shareholders. Even with this possible motivation, the law has
traditionally done little more than require that the transaction be
fair.
As with the duty of care, however, procedural mechanisms arose
in an effort to lessen the burden on directors seeking to engage in
self-dealing. Courts focused on the use of disinterested approval
mechanisms to alter the analysis. In the case of disinterested
approval by directors or shareholders, fairness disappeared entirely as
an element of the analysis. Shareholders were left with a cause of
action for waste, a difficult standard to meet.
Disney illustrates the consequences of this approach.27  The
company received shareholder approval of Michael Eisner's
compensation plan, which included stock options to buy 8 million
shares, and an executive bonus plan, which permitted the payment of
up to $10 million a year.7 As a result of the approval, shareholders
wanting to challenge the "fairness" of the transaction had to attack
the procedures used in obtaining approval, particularly an absence of
272. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).




complete disclosure. Once this proved unavailing, shareholders were
left with the impossible standard of proving waste, with the "fairness"
of the compensation never examined.274
Courts eliminated fairness with little discussion or analysis. They
did not examine the efficacy of the shareholder approval mechanism.
In applying the business judgment rule, they did not examine the
considerable difference between mismanagement and conflicts of
interest. They did not make any effort to devise a system that
eliminated or reduced interested influence on the disinterested voting
process. Finally, they did not ensure that shareholders were informed
at the time of ratification.
Analysis of the case law indicates that Delaware courts have
construed the concept of material information narrowly, with the
result that shareholders do not receive information of obvious
importance. A comparison with the federal disclosure cases shows a
marked difference in the interpretation of the materiality standard.
Thus, the omission of tax motivations was material in Mendell, a Rule
10b-5 case, and immaterial in Weingarden, a state fiduciary duty
case. 275  The consequence is that the "informed" approval of a
transaction is, in fact, not necessarily informed in the state context.
Admittedly it could be argued that the federal standard has it
wrong and that federal courts have defined "materiality" too loosely.
This interpretation, however, seems intuitively flawed. Shareholders
asked to approve the sale of a business would logically want
information suggesting the possibility of a higher price, either to
oppose the deal or to preserve the right to seek an appraisal. The
same is true of facts suggesting a conflict of interest.
The federal approach seems more rational for another reason.
Disinterested approval eliminates fairness. It does so even for those
274. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 368-69:
Therefore, our courts have treated fully informed shareholder ratification under
§ 144(a)(2) as validating the transaction and removing it from the purview of
entire fairness review. The business judgment rule applies to the ratified
transaction, and to rebut its presumption, the plaintiff must allege facts showing
that no person of ordinary sound business judgment could view the benefits
received as a fair exchange for consideration paid by the corporation, i.e., the
transaction amounts to complete waste.
(footnotes omitted).
275. In Weingarden & Stark v. Meenan Oil Co., Nos. 7291 & 87310, Del. Ch. LEXIS
374, at **6-7 (Del Ch. Jan. 2, 1985), the exclusion under the self-flagellation doctrine was
categorical:
The first alleged omission is the failure to disclose that a purported purpose of
the merger was to enable Kenny, Jr. to transfer his Meenan stockholdings to
Kenny, Ill free of estate taxes ... [i]t fails as a matter of law. Corporate officials
are not required to engage in "self-flagellation" or speculate as to alleged
improper motives.
MARCH 2003]
shareholders who oppose the transaction. The significant
consequences of disinterested approval dictate that courts err on the
side of ensuring shareholders receive all necessary information. This
suggests a need for a broad rather than narrow test for materiality.
The approach used by the Delaware courts needs to be
rethought. Given all of the issues and problems surrounding
disinterested approval, it seems inappropriate to use it to eliminate
fairness from the analysis. At the same time, disinterested approval
need not be ignored entirely. Sometimes the "disinterested"
shareholders might actually be disinterested. Sometimes they may
have adequate information. Allowing disinterested approval to shift
the burden to shareholders to demonstrate the unfairness of the
transaction, something already done when the transaction is between
a controlling shareholder and the corporation, would balance these
interests. It would recognize that disinterested approval had benefits
but would leave open the possibility that the transaction still could be
unfair.
Perhaps all of this is myopic. Maybe Delaware courts will change
their approach and conclude that disinterested approval shifts the
burden of proof rather than eliminates fairness altogether. At the
same time, if they impose a standard for showing unfairness that is
impossibly high, nothing will be different. It will be waste by another
name. If that is the case, it is probably better to leave things as they
are and call it by its true name.
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